Two Aspect Reading of Kant’s Thing in Itself

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران.

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

We cannot evaluate Kant's critical project without considering Transcendental Idealism, as it provides his solution to the enduring problem of metaphysics. Kant views transcendental idealism as a means through which metaphysics can follow 'the secure course of a science' (Bxiv), while also 'removing an obstacle that limits' (Bxxv) practical reason. The most contentious element of his proposal is his classification of empirical objects as appearances rather than things in themselves. This distinction restricts our knowledge to things as they appear, leaving their true nature beyond our cognitive grasp. In this article, I will explore Kant's concept of the 'thing in itself' and examine whether Allison's two-aspect interpretation is a valid representation of Kant's theory and if it effectively resolves its issues. The first part of this article will focus on Allison's two-aspect reading of the 'thing in itself' and his solutions to its paradoxes. The second part will address three objections raised by Guyer, who critiques Allison’s reading from a two-object perspective, and Kant's main argument in the Aesthetic. Lastly, I will evaluate the internal consistency of Allison’s interpretation and its alignment with Kant’s texts. I will conclude by demonstrating that, although (1) Allison consistently counters Guyer’s objections and (2) his interpretation captures the overall intent of Kant’s project, (3) it is not entirely consistent with Kant’s writings.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Two Aspect Reading of Kant’s Thing in Itself

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mahdi Ahmadi 1
  • Yousef Nozohour 2
1 Ph.D. Candidate of Philosophy, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran
2 Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]

We cannot evaluate Kant's critical project without considering Transcendental Idealism, as it provides his solution to the enduring problem of metaphysics. Kant views transcendental idealism as a means through which metaphysics can follow 'the secure course of a science' (Bxiv), while also 'removing an obstacle that limits' (Bxxv) practical reason. The most contentious element of his proposal is his classification of empirical objects as appearances rather than things in themselves. This distinction restricts our knowledge to things as they appear, leaving their true nature beyond our cognitive grasp. In this article, I will explore Kant's concept of the 'thing in itself' and examine whether Allison's two-aspect interpretation is a valid representation of Kant's theory and if it effectively resolves its issues. The first part of this article will focus on Allison's two-aspect reading of the 'thing in itself' and his solutions to its paradoxes. The second part will address three objections raised by Guyer, who critiques Allison’s reading from a two-object perspective, and Kant's main argument in the Aesthetic. Lastly, I will evaluate the internal consistency of Allison’s interpretation and its alignment with Kant’s texts. I will conclude by demonstrating that, although (1) Allison consistently counters Guyer’s objections and (2) his interpretation captures the overall intent of Kant’s project, (3) it is not entirely consistent with Kant’s writings.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Kant
  • Thing in Itself
  • Henry Allison
  • Transcendental Idealism
  • Refutation of Idealism

مراجع

Allison, H. E. (1973). The Kant-Eberhard Controversy. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Allison, H. E. (1989). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (review). Journal of Philosophy, 214-21.
Allison, H. E. (1990). Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
Allison, H. E. (1996). Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Allison, H. E. (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.
Ameriks, K. (1982). Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1-24.
Ameriks, K. (1992). Kantian Idealism Today. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 329-42.
Beck, L. (1960). A Commentaryon Kant's ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. University of Chicago Press.
Gardner, S., & Grist, M. (Eds.). (2015). The Transcendental Turn. Oxford University Press.
Gerold, P. (1974). Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. Bouvier.
Guyer, P. (1987). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2006). Kant. Routledge.
Kant, I. (1977). Critique of Pure Reason. (A. Wood, P. Guyer, Eds., A. Wood, & P. Guyer, Trans.) Cambridge University Press.
Prichard, H. (1909). Kant's Theory of Knowledge. Clarendon Press.
Stang, N. (Winter 2018). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
Strawson, P. (1966). The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Methuen.
Wood, A. (1987). Kant's Rational Theology. Cornell University Press.
 
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