مجله پژوهش های فلسفی

Journal of Philosophical Investigations

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Does Kantianism Imply Some Sort of Conceptual Creationism?

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Finland

چکیده

I argue in the essay that the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation ultimately leads to the kind of view that Panayot Butchvarov calls conceptual or linguistic creationism. According to this view, “there is nothing we have not conceptualized”. In addition to being an antithesis of metaphysical realism, which maintains that there is a reality independent of us, the term refers to the kind of thinking that sees human cognitive experience (and reality itself) as thoroughly constituted according to our concepts. While it might be easy to attribute this kind of position to Kant as well, especially when read through a conceptualist lens, I argue that such a position is not in accord with Kant’s philosophical intentions. Using the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason as examples, I also argue that on the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation too much is read into Kant’s idea that sensibility and understanding must be cognitively compatible with one another.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Does Kantianism Imply Some Sort of Conceptual Creationism?

نویسنده [English]

  • Hemmo Laiho

Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Finland

چکیده [English]

I argue in the essay that the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation ultimately leads to the kind of view that Panayot Butchvarov calls conceptual or linguistic creationism. According to this view, “there is nothing we have not conceptualized”. In addition to being an antithesis of metaphysical realism, which maintains that there is a reality independent of us, the term refers to the kind of thinking that sees human cognitive experience (and reality itself) as thoroughly constituted according to our concepts. While it might be easy to attribute this kind of position to Kant as well, especially when read through a conceptualist lens, I argue that such a position is not in accord with Kant’s philosophical intentions. Using the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason as examples, I also argue that on the conceptualist understanding of the mind-world relation too much is read into Kant’s idea that sensibility and understanding must be cognitively compatible with one another.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • concept
  • intuition
  • Kant
  • mind
  • understanding
  • sensibility
  • world
مراجع
Allais, L. (2009). Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3), 383-413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.0.0134
Allais, L. (2015). Manifest Reality. Kant’s Idealism and His Realism. Oxford University Press.
Allais, L. (2016). Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism in Kant: A Survey of the Recent Debate. In D. Kantian Nonconceptualism. pp. 1-25, Edited by Schulting, Palgrave.
Allison, H. E. (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Yale University Press.
Bertenthal, B & al. (2007). Phenomenal permanence and the development of predictive tracking in infancy. Child Dev. 78 (1), 350-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01002.x
Butchvarov, P. (2002). Metaphysical Realism and Logical Nonrealism. In The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. pp. 282-302, Edited by R. M. Gale, Blackwell,
Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett.
Hanna, R. (2015). Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Kant, I. (1900-). Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Edited by D. Wissenschaften, Reimer/de Gruyter.
Kant, I. (1999). Correspondence, translated & Edited by A. Zweig, Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2000). Critique of Pure Reason. translated & Edited by P. Guyer & A. Wood, Cambridge University Press. (CPR A/B)
Kant, I. (2002). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science.In Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, translated by G. hatfield, Edited by H. Allison & P. Heath, Cambridge University Press.
Laiho, H. (2019). Types of Representational Content in Kant.” Kantian Journal 38 (1), 31-54.
Longuenesse, B. (2000). Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Charles, translated by T. Wolfe, Princeton University Press. (Original publication 1993)
McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World. With a New Introduction by the Author. Harvard University Press. (Original publication 1994)
McDowell, J. (1998). The Woodbridge Lectures 1997: Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant and Intentionality. The Journal of Philosophy, 95 (9), 431-491.
McDowell, J. (2002). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In Vision and Mind. Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, pp. 443-458, Edited by A. Noë & E. Thompson, The MIT Press.
McLear, C. (2020). Kantian Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edited by E. N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/kant-onceptualism
Stalnaker, R. (2003). What Might Nonconceptual Content Be? In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. pp. 95-106, Edited by Y. H. Gunther, The MIT Press. (Original publication 1998)
Williams, J. J. (2012). How Conceptually Guided Are Kantian Intuitions? History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (1), 57-78. https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2021.v9n1.p97
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Edited by C. K. Ogden & F. P. Ramsey, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
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