The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی (ره)

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی (ره)

3 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی (ره)

چکیده

هایدگر متقدّم، در راستای تأسیس اُنتولوژی بنیادی، تا حدودی از بررسی فهم عامیانه‌ زمان چشم‌پوشی می‌کند و به تحلیل زمان‌مندی می‌پردازد. او معتقد است که فهم عامیانه  زمان، تنزّل زمان جهانی و خود زمان جهانی، تنزّل زمان‌مندی است. هایدگر در هستی و زمان، زمان‌مندی را به «معنای اُنتولوژیک پروا» تعبیر میکند. در این‌جا، برای تحلیل زمان‌مندی در اندیشه‌ هایدگر، بر همین عبارت سه جزئی تکیه می‌شود. اُنتولوژیک در تقابل با اُنتیک قرار می‌گیرد. پژوهش اُنتیک، پژوهشی است که هستومند را چونان چیزی فرادست و متعیّن در نظر می‌گیرد، امّا در مقابل پژوهش اُنتولوژیک، معطوف است به چطور‌ـ‌هستن هستومندی که با افکندن خود بر امکان‌هایش، دائماً از خودش پیشی می‌جوید. معنا، آنی نیست که در انتهای کنش فهمیدن، آشکار گردد؛ بلکه آنی است که فهم‌پذیری هر چیز خودش را در آن حفظ می‌کند؛ یعنی شرط امکان فهم‌پذیری یک چیز است. پروا، دلالت می‌کند بر چیزی که به جنبه‌های ساختاری دازاین، کلیّت و وحدت می‌بخشد. پروا که معنای هستن دازاین است، ازطریق سه مؤلفه‌ اگزیستانس، واقع‌بودگی و سقوط‌کردگی تقویم می‌شود. زمان‌مندی، معنای اُنتولوژیک پروا است؛ یعنی شرط امکان فهم‌پذیری آن. هایدگر برای توضیح این سخن، دست به تحلیل اگزیستانس اصیل می‌زند. ساختار اُنتولوژیک اگزیستانس اصیل، «مصمّمیّت پیشی‌جوینده به ‌سوی مرگ» است. اگزیستانس مصمّمی که بر مرگ پیشی می‌جوید، خودش را در سه برون‌خویشی آینده‌سویی، بودگی، و حاضرساختن عیان می‌کند. هر یک از این سه برون‌خویشی، به ترتیب، بنیان و معنای یکی از مؤلفه‌های پروا است. درنتیجه، زمان‌مندی در وحدت‌اش، بنیان و معنای اُنتولوژیک کلّ پروا است.

تازه های تحقیق

Temporality in Heidegger’s Early Thought

Ehsan Nazari1, Seyed Masoud Sayf2 Mohammad Hassn Heidari3 Ali Naghi Baghershahi4

1 Ph.D. candidate of philosophy at Imam Khomeini International University, (Corresponding Author). E-mail:Ehsan.ph.86@gmail.com

2 Associate Professor at Imam Khomeini International University, E-mail: seif@hum.ikiu.ac.ir

3Assistant Professor at Imam Khomeini International University, E-mail: m_heidari@ikiu.ac.ir

4Associate Professor at Imam Khomeini International University, E-mail: baghershahi@hum.ikiu.ac.ir

 

 Abstract

For the establishment of the fundamental ontology, early Heidegger disregards the vulgar understanding of time and analyzes temporality. He believes that the vulgar understanding of time is the degeneration of the world-time, and the world-time itself is the degeneration of temporality. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets temporality as the ontological sense of care. Here, this three-part phrase is relied on to interpret temporality in the thought of Heidegger. The ontological counteracts the ontic. The ontic investigation is one that considers the entity present-at-hand and determined. But the ontological investigation focuses on the how-being of an entity that is always anticipating itself by projecting itself upon its possibilities. The sense is not what is revealed at the end of the understanding act; but is what wherein the understandability of something maintains itself, namely, the condition for the possibility of understandability of a thing. Care implies what gives totality and unity to the structural aspects of Dasein. Care, which is the sense of Dasein’s being, is constituted through three items including existence, facticity, and fallenness. Temporality is the ontological sense of care; namely, the condition for the possibility of its understandability. Heidegger analyzes authentic existence to explain this word. The ontological structure of authentic existence is the anticipatory resoluteness towards death. The resolute existence that anticipates to death shows itself in the three ecstasies futurity, having-been, and making-present. Each of these three ecstasies is respectively the sense of one of the items of care. Hence, temporality in its unity is the ontological sense of care.

Keywords: Time, Temporality, Early Heidegger, Ontological, Sense, Care.

 

 

1- Introduction

In accord with Heidegger’s word, all previous philosophers forgot Being and correlatively neglected the true sense of time. The most influential interpretation of time, he believes, belongs to Aristotle. For an accurate investigation of the concept of time, we must inevitably turn back to Aristotle.

2- Heidegger's Confrontation with Aristotelian Interpretation of Time

2-1. Aristotle on Definition of Time

Aristotle explains time through the motion and extension is one of the key elements of motion. On a motion as an extension, countless successive points are assumed. These points are considered before and after concerning each other. When we understand the motion in terms of before and after, we also perceive time as a quantity.

2-2. The Necessity of passing through the Aristotelian Definition of Time and attain to an Originary Time (Temporality)

As Heidegger believed, in Aristotle's definition of motion, concepts of before and after must return to the earlier and later as comparatives. Clearly, ‘earlier and later are time-determinants’. So, we encounter time on the horizon of time. Heidegger believes that one of these two times is more originary than Aristotelian time. This originary time is called temporality.

3- Temporality as the Ontological Sense of Care

3-1. The Ontological

The meaning of the ontic and the ontological must be understood in differentiating beings and Being. Reference of an ontic is timeless and determined beings, while an ontological finds its reference within the process of how those beings determined.

3-2. The Sense

The sense is upon-which or realm of understanding in the manner of projecting. The sense in which the intelligibility of something preserves itself makes possible any understanding.

3-3. The Care

Being-in as one of the moments of being-in-the-world is constituted through understanding, attunement, and falling. Each of these three is based on one of the elements of care (existence, facticity, and fallenness). Being-in in its totality, therefore, is based on the care in its totality. In other words, care is the prior condition of being-in. The care itself has an articulated structure with various elements. Temporality makes ‘Totality of the articulated structural whole of care’ possible.

4- Temporality and Authentic Existence

To describe the relationship between care and temporality more precisely, Heidegger analyzes the authentic existence.

4-1. Authentic and Inauthentic

Taking notice of death as its ultimate possibility, Dasein realizes its possibilities are finite; the Being-towards-death leads to authentication of Dasein. Inauthentic Dasein, in contrast, becomes negligent of death by absorbing in One.

4-2. Temporality as the Foundation of the Authentic Existence

Authentic Dasein exists in a way which called ‘anticipatory resoluteness’. Such a way of being is futural. Heidegger attains ‘having-been’, through futurity of existence. The futurity which has been released the Present. The unified phenomenon of futurity which makes present in the process of having been is called temporality.

5- Conclusion

Futurity, having-been, and making-present are three ecstasies of the temporality. Each of these ecstasies makes one of the elements of care possible. Thus, temporality in its unity makes care as a whole possible.

References

-        Barnes, J. (1991) Complete Works (Aristotle), Princeton, Princeton University Press.

-        Dahlstrom, D. O. (2013) The Heidegger Dictionary, London, Bloomsbury Academic.

-        Descartes, R. (2003) Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, New York, Dover Publications.

-        Dreyfus, H. L. (1995) Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

-        Heidegger, M. (1976a) Gesamtausgabe 9: Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.

-        Heidegger, M. (1975b) Gesamtausgabe 24: Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.

-        Heidegger, M. (1988) Gesamtausgabe 42: Schelling; Von Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit (1809), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.

-        Macquarrie, J. (1968) Martin Heidegger, Richmond, Virginia, John Knox Press.

-        Palmer, R. (1969) Hermeneutics, Evanston, Northwestern University Press.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Temporality in Heidegger’s Early Thought

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ehsan Nazari 1
  • Seyed Masoud Sayf 2
  • Mohammadhasan Heidari 3
  • Ali Naghi Baghershahi 2

1 Ph.D. student of philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University.

3 -Assistant Professor at Imam Khomeini International University

چکیده [English]

For the establishment of the fundamental ontology, early Heidegger disregards the vulgar understanding of time and analyzes temporality. He believes that the vulgar understanding of time is the degeneration of the world-time, and the world-time itself is the degeneration of temporality. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets temporality as the ontological sense of care. Here, this three-part phrase is relied on to interpret temporality in the thought of Heidegger. The ontological counteracts the ontic. The ontic investigation is one that considers the entity present-at-hand and determined. But the ontological investigation focuses on the how-being of an entity that is always anticipating itself by projecting itself upon its possibilities. The sense is not what is revealed at the end of the understanding act; but is what wherein the understandability of something maintains itself, namely, the condition for the possibility of understandability of a thing. Care implies what gives totality and unity to the structural aspects of Dasein. Care, which is the sense of Dasein’s being, is constituted through three items including existence, facticity, and fallenness. Temporality is the ontological sense of care; namely, the condition for the possibility of its understandability. Heidegger analyzes authentic existence to explain this word. The ontological structure of authentic existence is the anticipatory resoluteness towards death. The resolute existence that anticipates to death shows itself in the three ecstasies futurity, having-been, and making-present. Each of these three ecstasies is respectively the sense of one of the items of care. Hence, temporality in its unity is the ontological sense of care.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Time
  • Temporality
  • Early Heidegger
  • Ontological
  • Sense
  • Care
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-       Blattner, W. (2005) “Temporality”. A Companion to Heidegger, Dreyfus, H. L. [& Wrathall, M. A.], Malden, Blackwell, 311-324.
-       Cooper, J. M. (editor) (1997) Plato: Complete Works, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company.
-       Dahlstrom, D. O. (2013) The Heidegger Dictionary, London, Bloomsbury Academic.
-       Descartes, R. (2003) Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, New York, Dover Publications.
-       Diels, H. A. (1960) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin-Neukölln, Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
-       Dreyfus, H. L. (1995) Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
-       Heidegger, M. (1978) Gesamtausgabe 1: Frühe Schriften, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1977) Gesamtausgabe 2: Sein und Zeit, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1975a) Gesamtausgabe 5:Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1996a) Gesamtausgabe 6/1: Nietzsche, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1997) Gesamtausgabe 6/2: Nietzsche, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1976a) Gesamtausgabe 9: Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1986) Gesamtausgabe 15:Seminare, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1976b) Gesamtausgabe 21: Logik; Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1975b) Gesamtausgabe 24: Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1996b) Gesamtausgabe 27: Einleitung in die Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1983) Gesamtausgabe 29-30: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik; Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1988) Gesamtausgabe 42: Schelling; Von Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit (1809), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1991a) Gesamtausgabe 49: Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus (Schelling), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1985) Gesamtausgabe 61: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles; Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
-       Heidegger, M. (1991b) Nietzsche. Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics & Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. by David Farrel Krell, San Francisco, And Harper & Row Publishers.
-       Inwood, M. (1999) A Heidegger Dictionary, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers Inc.
-       Inwood, M. (2000) Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction, New York, Oxford University Press Inc.
-       Käufer, S. (2013): “Temporality as the Ontological Sense of Care”. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time, Mark A. Wrathall, New York, Cambridge University Press, 338-359.
-       Macquarrie, J. (1968) Martin Heidegger, Richmond, Virginia, John Knox Press.
-       Palmer, R. (1969) Hermeneutics, Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
-       Richardson, W. J. (2003) Heidegger: through phenomenology to thought, New York, Fordham University Press.
-       Ross, W. E. (1936) Aristotle's Physics, London, Oxford University Press.
-       White, C. J. (2005): “Heidegger and the Greeks”. A Companion to Heidegger, Dreyfus, H. L. [& Wrathall, M. A.], Malden, Blackwell, 121-140.
-       Zahavi, D. (2006) Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective, London, the MIT Press.
 
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