The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات تهران، تهران، ایران

2 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه هنر تهران

چکیده

 در این مقاله نشان خواهیم داد که نسبت والایی و اخلاق در دوره‌ی پیشانقدی تفکر کانت شکل فلسفی نظام‌مندی ندارد و علت آن را می‌توان در این دو چیز جست: اولاً در این دوره احساس زیبایی‌شناختی و احساس اخلاقی متمایز از یکدیگر نیستند و برحسب یکدیگر تعریف می‌شوند. ثانیاً اخلاق مبتنی‌بر احساس است، نه عقل عملی محض و اصل پیشین آن. کانت در مشاهداتی در باب احساس امر زیبا و امر والا انسان‌ها را فرامی‌خواند تا اصول اخلاقی‌شان را بر عاطفه‌ی کلی بنا کنند. این اصول هرچند کلی‌اند، اما قوعد نظری نیستند و هر فرد باید آن‌ها را با رجوع به قلبش بیابد. این اصول همان احساس زیبایی و کرامت طبیعت انسان است. در ملاحظاتی بر مشاهداتی در باب احساس امر زیبا و امر والا با آن‌که در تفکر کانت نسبت‌به اخلاق دگرگونی‌هایی صورت می‌گیرد و عناصری وارد آن می‌شوند که بعداً در دوره‌ی نقدی پایه و اساس قرار می‌گیرند، اما او هم‌چنان معتقد است که احساس اخلاقی نوعی احساس لذت و درد است که نسبت‌به آن منفعل نیستیم و می‌توانیم فعالانه در آن مداخله کنیم. علت آن هم برخوردار بودن از آزادی اخلاقی است.

تازه های تحقیق

The Relationship between Sublimity and Morality in Kant's Pre-critical Thought (regarding observations... and remarks...)

Fatemeh Mehrzad Sadaghiani1, Masoud Olia2

  1. 1.     MA, Islamic Azad University, North Tehran Branch, Email: marzieh362@gmail.com
  2. 2.     Associate Professor, University of Zanjan,(corresponding author) Email: hfatzade@znu.ac.ir

 

Abstract

This essay considers the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’s pre-critical thinking doesn’t have a systematic philosophical form. The reasons can be sought out in these two things are: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and it is a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in the critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom.

Keywords: Sublimity, General affection, Virtue, Moral feeling, Moral freedom.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

The concept of the sublime has undergone fundamental evolutions throughout history, but it has always maintained its relation to the moral and the transcendent. Kant in his precritical thought as well as in his transcendental philosophy has described this relationship clearly.

   In this essay we are going to examine this relationship in two works of the pre-critical period of Kant’s thought, naming Observations… and Remarks in the Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. These two works were written in the 1760s when Kant tends to a newly-established movement, named “popular philosophy”. This movement had fewer abstract aspects, instead, it was more practical and wanted to simplify philosophy for ordinary people. With this point in mind, we are going to show how morality and sublimity relate to each other and also what the quality of this relationship is.

Kant’s Approach in Pre-critical Period

In this period, Kant regards aesthetics as a posteriori discipline that has no rule. In aesthetics, feeling is more important than understanding. The other feature of pre-critical aesthetics is that it has been written for ordinary people to improve their taste. Kant, in those works, tries to introduce the ways of achieving the goals that nature has set for us. In his view, these ways are "finer feelings", which are "feelings of sublime and beautiful."

Because of this kind of approach, some commentators believe that there is no analysis of the concepts of the beautiful and the sublime in those two works and therefore it is impossible to take a coherent philosophical theory out of them. In contrast, the other commentators believe pre-critical and critical thought cannot be separated, because Kant has the same concerns about aesthetics and morality in these two periods.

The Relationship between Sublimity and Morality in Observations

In this section, we will examine the characteristics of the beautiful and the sublime to show which one has a stronger relationship with morality. A way of connecting sublimity to morality is general principles. In Kant’s view, among moral qualities, only true virtue is sublime and true virtue can only be grafted upon principles. Kant argues that these principles which are the basis of sublimity, are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast. It is a kind of universal moral feeling that subordinates one’s particular inclinations to an enlarged one. This feeling culminates in “genuine virtue” which is distinct from adopted virtue and the simulacrum of virtue. The first one is related to the feeling of the beautiful and the second one to the feeling of honor. Meanwhile, genuine virtue is tightly connected to the feeling of the sublime.

The Relationship between Sublimity and Morality in Remarks 

This work shows the evolution of Kant’s thought toward a rationalist moral theory about observations. In this work, Kant differentiated moral obligation from aesthetic categories to emphasize that obligation is more concerned with universality and necessity.

The other concept that has a central role in this work is human freedom and has four meanings. Freedom in the proper sense is moral freedom and is also the principle of virtue. Moral freedom is fulfilled through general will and what is necessary through a general will is an obligation. About the relationship between sublimity and morality, Kant believes that “beautiful actions consist of those to which one has no obligation” or “one must conceal an obligation to be beautiful.” In conclusion, what is related to obligation and moral freedom is the sublime.

Conclusion

In both pre-critical and critical periods of Kant’s thought, there is a special relationship between the concept of the sublime and morality and sometimes there are some common points in the relationship in two periods. But what differentiates these two periods is that in critical philosophy Kant has separated morality from aesthetics by grounding morality on the pure practical reason, while in the pre-critical period these two fields are described in terms of each other. However studying the works of this period on aesthetics and morality, can pave the way to understand the evolution of Kant’s thought and also the second and third Critiques.

References

-   Kant, Immanuel (2005) Notes and Fragments, Translated by Curtis bowman; Paul Guyer; Frederick Rauscher, New York: Cambridge University Press.

-   Kant, Immanuel (2007) Anthropology, History, Education, Edited by Gunter Zoller and Robert B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-   Kant, Immanuel (2012) Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, Edited by Patrick Frierson; Paul Guyer, New York: Cambridge University Press.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Relationship between Sublimity and Morality in Kant's Pre-critical Thought (regarding observations... and remarks...)

نویسندگان [English]

  • Fateme Mehrzad Sadaghiani 1
  • Masoud Olia 2

1 PhD Student of philosophy, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Tehran University of Art

چکیده [English]

This essay is going to show that the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’s precritical thinking doesn’t have a systematic philosophical form. The reason can be sought out in these two things: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and its a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Sublimity
  • General affection
  • virtue
  • Moral feeling
  • Moral freedom
-        Allison, Henry (2001) Kant’s Theory of taste, New York: Cambridge University Press.
-        Clewis, Robert (2009) The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, New York: Cambridge University Press.
-        Kant, Immanuel (2005) Notes and Fragments, Translated by Curtis bowman; Paul Guyer; Frederick Rauscher, New York: Cambridge University Press.
-        Kant, Immanuel (2007) Anthropology, History, Education, Edited by Gunter Zoller and Robert B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-        Kant, Immanuel (2012) Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, Edited by Patrick Frierson; Paul Guyer, New York: Cambridge University Press.
-        Meld Shell, Susan; Richard Velkley (2012) Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-        Rayman, Joshua (2012) Kant on Sublimity and Morality, Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
-        Shaw, Philip (2006) The Sublime, London; New York: Rutledge.
-        Zammito, John (1992) The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.
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