The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز

چکیده

ابژه­های داستانی مانند «سیمرغ» و «رستم» یا «هملت» و «هلمز» همواره برای منطق­دانان و نظریه­پردازان‌‌ ادراک گرفتاری آفریده­اند. ریشۀ گرفتاری در اینجا است که از سویی دربارۀ این ابژه­ها می­اندیشیم یا دربارۀ آنها گزاره­هایی صادق پیش می­نهیم و از سوی دیگر ناتوان­ایم از این که آنها را در جهان پیرامون خود بیابیم و نشان دهیم. بدینسان گروهی بر آن­ هستند که به هیچ رو چیزی همچون ابژه­های داستانی در کار نیست و تنها فریبی زبانی ما را به پذیرش آنها وامی­دارد. با این همه گروهی دیگر، که خود را از پذیرش این ابژه­ها ناگزیر می­یابند، در پی آن بوده­اند تا شیوۀ هستی آنها را بررسی کنند. اینان یا ابژه­های داستانی را ابژه­هایی انتزاعی و ایدئال شمرده­اند یا ابژه­هایی ممکن یا حتی ابژه­هایی ناموجود. با این همه، کار هر دو گروه با گرفتاری­هایی رویارو بوده­است. در این میان، اینگاردن گره کار را در این می­بیند که هستی­شناسان تاکنون یکی از نحوه­های ممکن هستی را نادیده­ گرفته­اند. بدینسان، او به بازنگری در نحوه­های هستی می­پردازد و از این رهگذر، هم برای ابژه­های داستانی جایی باز می­کند هم برای آثار هنری و دیگر ابژه­های فرهنگی. او ابژه­های داستانی را دارای نحوۀ هستی محضاً قصدی می­شمرد. بدین معنا که هستی آنها، گرچه متعالی از آگاهی است، از جهات گوناگون به کنش­های آگاهی وابسته­است. در این نوشته نخست از نگرش­های پیشین یاد می­کنیم و سپس رای اینگاردن را پیش می­نهیم.

تازه های تحقیق

Roman Ingarden on Ontology of Fictional Objects

Vahid Gholamipour Fard

PhD. Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, E-mail: vahid_gh.fard@yahoo.com

 

 Abstract

Fictional objects like “Hamlet” or “Rostam” pose many problems for Logicians and thinkers theorizing about perception. The problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we think and speak about these objects and, on the other hand, we can’t find them in our world. Two groups are theorizing this issue. Proponents of the first group think that there are not any fictional object; they are just words. The others find these objects indispensable and they work on the ontology of them. The latter thinkers offer different views on the ‘mode of being’ of fictional objects. But these two groups have faced some problems. However, Roman Ingarden sees the main problem in ignoring one of the possible modes of being. He shows that fictional objects are “purely intentional objects” depending first and foremost on conscious acts and also on some physical or ideal object. In this paper, we offer the ideas of the above-mentioned groups and then propose Ingarden’s views.

Keywords: fictional objects, existential dependence, modes of being, heteronomous objects, purely intentional objects.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

Fictional objects cause some problems in logic and perception. Therefore some philosophers working in these areas seek to reject these objects completely. They reject fictional objects as a product of language deceptions or improper speech. However, others find it indispensable that there are fictional objects in some mode of being. They suppose that fictional objects are non-existent objects or abstract objects or possible objects. But they have many problems. Contrary to the two groups that accept or reject fictional objects, Ingarden find a conceptual apparatus to explain the mode of being of these objects by rethinking ontological categories.‌‌‌‌

Fictional objects in logic and language

The propositions ‘unicorn does not exist’ or “Holmes is a fictional character” lead us to the point that we should accept that, according to logical rules, unicorn and Holmes exist. However, Russel thinks that this is not the case. If we paraphrase the proposition, according to the logic and theory of ‘determinate descriptions’, the fictional names do not appear in subject term and so there is not any reason for accepting their existence.

Fictional objects in perception

Every day, we intend fictional objects in reading stories or seeing paintings, etc. Perception is an intentional act and it should have some object. So we should accept that fictional objects as the objects of our intentional acts exist. But in Husserl’s view, it is possible that a conscious act does not have any object; there are object-less acts. Yet they are intentional because they have some content. In intending fictional objects, the act has no object, not a merely real object. For Husserl, we think that there are fictional objects just because we speak improperly as if there are fictional objects.

Accepting fictional objects

The writers who accept fictional objects propose various ontological views on their mode of being. Meinong views them as non-existent objects. They do not exist actually but they have a weak mode of being, namely, non-existence. Meinong’s critics accuse him of considering fictional objects as abstract objects, which are not created but just are selected and used in a text or painting etc. by an artist. Fictional objects like other artifacts are created and so they cannot be abstract or ideal objects.‌‌

Existence of fictional objects in Ingarden

We should see Ingarden’s view in contrast with views of two groups: the one that rejects fictional objects and the other that accepts them and work on the ontology of them according to traditional categories. For Ingarden, their difficulties have their root in the fact that they ignore an important category or mode of being and they work with only two mode of being: real and ideal. 

Ingarden proposes four modes of being: absolute, ideal, real, and purely intentional. Purely intentional objects have their ontic foundation in conscious acts and they depend on consciousness for their persistence. However, they transcend conscious acts in the sense that none of their moments are moments of corresponding acts. First and foremost, purely intentional objects are heteronomous objects. Their properties are not imminent in them. They are only ascribed to them by conscious acts of the artist who create them in a work or those who intend them in the work. Second, they have points of indeterminacy. They are constituted by limited sentences or limited acts. So there are many of their properties that are not determined. We should notice that this indeterminacy is ontological, not epistemological. Third, they are two-sided. Regarding their structure, they are purely intentional objects and they depend on conscious acts. But regarding their content, they can be in any mode of being, real or ideal or even purely intentional. Fictional objects have these properties too. First, “Hamlet’ on itself has no property. Shakespeare intended him to have some properties and readers of Hamlet should ascribe him the properties mentioned in the text. Second, “Hamlet” is two-sided. On the one hand, he is created by Shakespeare and he depends on conscious acts, but, on the other hand, he is a real man in the fictional world. Third, “Hamlet” has many points of indeterminacy. He has only those properties that Shakespeare wrote in the play. We do not know his weight or height. We don’t know whether he is right-handed or not. However, when we intend him, we concretize his indeterminate properties, that is, determine them in imagination.‌‌‌‌

Conclusion

The concept of purely intentional being makes it possible to explain many of the ontological properties of a fictional object. Moreover, it allows us to transcend the related problems in logic and perception.

References

-        Ingarden(1973) Roman, The Literary Work of Art, translated by George G. Grabowicz, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

-        Ingarden (2013) Controversy over the Existence of the World (vol.1), Translated and annotated by Arthur Szylewicz, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang.

-        Ingarden (2016) Controversy over the Existence of the World vol. II, translated by Arthur Szylewicz, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Roman Ingarden on Ontology of Fictional Objects

نویسنده [English]

  • Vahid Gholamipour fard

PhD. Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz

چکیده [English]

Fictional objects like “Hamlet” or “Rostam” pose many problems for Logicians and thinkers theorizing about perception. The problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we think and speak about these objects and, on the other hand, we can’t find them in our world. Two groups are theorizing this issue. Proponents of the first group think that there are not any fictional object; they are just words. The others find these objects indispensable and they work on the ontology of them. The latter thinkers offer different views on the ‘mode of being’ of fictional objects. But these two groups have faced some problems. However, Roman Ingarden sees the main problem in ignoring one of the possible modes of being. He shows that fictional objects are “purely intentional objects” depending first and foremost on conscious acts and also on some physical or ideal object. In this paper, we offer the ideas of the above-mentioned groups and then propose Ingarden’s views.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • fictional objects
  • existential dependence
  • modes of being
  • heteronomous objects
  • purely intentional objects
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