Mohammad Hossein Mohamad Ali Khalaj
Abstract
The paper aims to examine and criticize recent approaches suggested by some virtue reliabilists. To this end, section 2 provides a sketch of Sosa’s triple account of knowledge, ...
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The paper aims to examine and criticize recent approaches suggested by some virtue reliabilists. To this end, section 2 provides a sketch of Sosa’s triple account of knowledge, on which knowledge is described as a cognitive achievement and an apt belief. Borrowing some lines from Lackey and Pritchard’s criticisms, I try to show that Sosa’s account is vulnerable to two distinct problems in section 3: the problem of cases of knowledge which are not cognitive achievements, and the problem of non-classic Gettier cases. Section 4 discusses four recent approaches pursued by some prominent virtue epistemologists, seeking to show how each of them responds to the above distinct problems. These four approaches are as follows: Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, Sosa and Turri’s dispositional account, Greco and Littlejohn’s safety-based account of ability, and knowledge-first virtue epistemology from Miracchi and kelp. In addition to addressing standard complaints to each of these accounts, I put forward new arguments against some of them, making clear that all of these approaches face severe difficulties in explaining knowledge and justification. Finally, in section 5, I sketch an alternative version of virtue epistemology which I call know-how-first virtue epistemology. Inspired by know-how-first anti-intellectualism, I put forward an argument in favor of know-how-first virtue epistemology, trying to provide good answers to the mentioned challenges which every virtue reliabilism should face.