Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Research Fellow at Science Studies Department, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Iran
Abstract
The paper aims to examine and criticize recent approaches suggested by some virtue reliabilists. To this end, section 2 provides a sketch of Sosa’s triple account of knowledge, on which knowledge is described as a cognitive achievement and an apt belief. Borrowing some lines from Lackey and Pritchard’s criticisms, I try to show that Sosa’s account is vulnerable to two distinct problems in section 3: the problem of cases of knowledge which are not cognitive achievements, and the problem of non-classic Gettier cases. Section 4 discusses four recent approaches pursued by some prominent virtue epistemologists, seeking to show how each of them responds to the above distinct problems. These four approaches are as follows: Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, Sosa and Turri’s dispositional account, Greco and Littlejohn’s safety-based account of ability, and knowledge-first virtue epistemology from Miracchi and kelp. In addition to addressing standard complaints to each of these accounts, I put forward new arguments against some of them, making clear that all of these approaches face severe difficulties in explaining knowledge and justification. Finally, in section 5, I sketch an alternative version of virtue epistemology which I call know-how-first virtue epistemology. Inspired by know-how-first anti-intellectualism, I put forward an argument in favor of know-how-first virtue epistemology, trying to provide good answers to the mentioned challenges which every virtue reliabilism should face.
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