Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 PhD Candidate of philosophy,, University of Tabriz
2 Associate Professor of philosophy,, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran
Abstract
In critical philosophy, nature is sum of objects of the activity of judging. Because this activity is autonomous, i.e. according to transcendental principles, nature is a horizon constituted by these principles. In first Critique, nature is domain of objects of finite cognition as far as their form is concerned, and constituted by transcendental principles of understanding. The constitution of form of object, not of its matter, is possible because of finitude of man's cognition. In second Critique, nature is domain of objects of reason, i.e. free wills, and constituted by moral law. Finality of this nature is mark of finitude of man's action. In third Critique, nature is a priori horizon opened by transcendental principle of reflective judging. It is a field where man reflects upon objects of cognition as far as their diversity and contingency is concerned, and this is another aspect of the finitude of man's cognition. Thus analysis of concept of nature through three Critiques is analysis of man's finitude. In its totality, this analysis shows what it means to be a man, i.e. a finite free being in sensible world. This is how Kant's analysis of concept of nature through three Critiques is a part of his effort to answer the one question which he says to be the main question of critical philosophy, i.e. that of what man is. And as it is clear, we can understand this answer and so the critical philosophy only if we consider all three Critiques.
Highlights
This article is part of a study of the relation between Kant's three Critiques, based on the study of essential concepts of critical philosophy. One of these concepts is Nature. Here, we will study Kant's critical analysis of Nature in three Critiques.
Kant defines philosophy as rational cognition of objects through a priori concepts, i.e. concepts which are not taken from experience, but are the rules of subject's own cognitive activity and constitute the object of experience as such, i.e. its objectivity in general. These concepts do not say what objects are in their empirical features, but they make it an object of cognitive activity in general. Kant calls this aspect of object transcendental, as distinguished from empirical aspect. Objectivity of objects, which is constituted by subject's activity as its correlate, is what Kant calls Nature.
Three Critiques discover and analyze three kinds of Nature, which are found to be in relation with one another if one attends the development of critical philosophy through three Critiques. Kant introduces them through a metaphor concerning the relation of our concepts to objects: concepts have a "field" if we do not take in consideration whether their objects are cognizable or not. They have a "territory" if we consider their objects as cognizable. In territory, there are some concepts which determine what it means for an object to be cognized in general. These concepts have a "domain". Finally, the concepts in territory which have not a domain have a "residence". Concepts which have a domain are transcendental concepts of Nature.
The concepts constituting theoretical objects, i.e. objects of sensible nature, are called categories and sought in understanding as their a priori source. Since man's faculty of theoretical cognition is essentially finite (because of a priori forms of receptivity, i.e. space and time) categories must have a sensible meaning in order to constitute objects of this cognition. Thus they are schematized, i.e. get a temporal meaning. So we have a finite cognitive faculty with its correlative object as its domain. This analysis is carried out by first Critique.
The concept constituting practical object is freedom and is sought in reason as its a priori source. Its correlative object is man's will as self-determined. Since man's freedom is finite, it is an idea, i.e. a concept which sets man an a priori end which is not yet but unconditionally must be. So we have a finite free will and its object as its domain, which is the will itself experienced by itself as free, i.e. as being called by itself to determine itself independently of sensible effects. This analysis is carried out by second Critique.
But a problem arises concerning the relation of domains. The effects of man's free causality, i.e. her/his acts have to be realized in sensible nature, because man has not only reason but also a body through which she/he is in the world. So the problem is to find a concept to think this special kind of object which is in both domains at once, i.e. man or a body which is subjected to reason. Relating both domains to one another, this concept accomplishes man's definition.
In order to find this concept, critical analysis studies phenomena (beauty and organism) which belong to sensible nature in its diverse and contingent matter and not in its form as object of theoretical cognition. This study shows the insufficiency of categories to understand these objects of experience which are experienced not only as object in general but also as diverse and contingent. It is the concept of finality without end that meets this deficiency: objects of nature must be considered as parts of an unknown whole (an undetermined end) which is anticipated as an a priori horizon to make possible the experience of objects as diverse and contingent. But this type of objectivity does not belong to man's cognitive faculty as a finite one. We consider nature only as if it were a whole so that we can bring its contingent diversity under some kind of unity to experience it, although we cannot determine it as object of experience in general. So nature here is not a domain but a field of experience. Now we can extend this finality of nature in accordance with our cognitive ends to its finality in accordance with the ends of freedom: nature (including our body) is made so as to be, in its mechanism, subjected to the final end of freedom: the kingdom of ends, a community of free wills. All of this analysis is carried out by third Critique.
So Nature in critical philosophy consists of two domains which are related to one another in a field. These domains are transcendental conditions of experiencing two kinds of object and are based on subject's two finite cognitive activities. The field which relates the domains, is also based on subject's another finite cognitive activity which accomplishes the definition of man's finitude. As a being with free will that has to realize her/his acts through a body in sensible nature, she/he is also in a sense finite which relates the two previous (theoretical and practical) senses finitude: now that the sensible is independent of man as theoretically finite and the practical is an end (which is not yet but must be) to man as practically finite, both kinds of finitudes find their origin in man's duplicity as body and reason. Now that the critical philosophy wants to think this finitude and keep it and show it as it is, it expresses this finitude of man in the concept of finality without end, which makes possible to understand a free finite being's attitude in the world: hope for realization of freedom in her/his sensible world.
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