Scientific Revolutions and Progress: reflections on Kuhn's and Bhaskar's philosophy of science

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Master Student, Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, philosophy of science Department, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Scientificprogress is one of the topics that has always been considered in the philosophy of science and various accounts have been presented as regards the occurrence of progress.One of the most important challenges in progress is the radical changes in scientific theories, i.e. scientific revolutions.Kuhn considers these revolutions to be discontinuities in the history of science. Although he acknowledges progress in the normal science period by referring to the puzzle solving, he fails to explain the progress in scientific revolutions by proposing the incommensurability of paradigms.In contrast, Bhaskar by describing the stratified world, considers science as a continuous process with the aim of achieving causal mechanisms and structures, discovers and describes new and deeper layers. He explains progress on this basis and believes that sciencehas the potentiality of both change and progress. The present essay discusses the progress theories offered by Bhaskar and Kuhn. Also we compare the epistemological and ontological aspects of these perspectives in order to investigate Khun's inability to explain progress during the revolution in the light of Bhaskar's views.

Keywords

References

-       Archer, M.; Bhaskar, R.; Collier, A.; Lawson, T. & Norrie, A. (Eds.) (2013) Critical realism: Essential readings, Routledge.
-       Baert, P. (2005) Philosophy of the social sciences: Towards pragmatism, Polity.
-       Benton, T. & Craib, I. (2010) Philosophy of social science: The philosophical foundations of social thought, Macmillan International Higher Education.
-       Bhaskar, R. (2008) A Realist Theory of Science, Routledge.
-       Bird, A. (2007) “What is scientific progress?”, Noûs, 41(1), 64-89.
-       Chalmers, A. F. (1990) Science and its fabrication, University of Minnesota Press.
-       Chalmers, A. F. (2013) What is this thing called science?, Hackett Publishing.
-       Clarke, S. (2010) “Transcendental realisms in the philosophy of science: on Bhaskar and Cartwright”, Synthese, 173(3), 299-315.
-       Damböck, C. (2014) “Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework”, Synthese, 191(10), 2195-2213.
-       Dellsén, F. (2018) “Scientific progress: Four accounts”, Philosophy Compass, 13(11), e12525.
-       Duindam, G. (2018) “Why critical realists ought to be transcendental idealists”, Journal of Critical Realism, 17(3), 297-307.
-       Fleetwood, S. (2011) “Powers and tendencies revisited”, Journal of Critical Realism, 10(1), 80-99.
-       Fleetwood, S. (2017) “The critical realist conception of open and closed systems”, Journal of economic methodology, 24(1), 41-68.
-       Hibberd, F. J. (2010) “Situational realism, critical realism, causation and the charge of positivism”, History of the Human Sciences, 23(4), 37-51.
-       Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1990) “Kuhn's conception of incommensurability”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 21(3), 481-492.
-       Kuhn, T. S. (1970) the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press.
-       Losee, J. (2004) Theories of scientific progress: An introduction, Routledge.
-       Niiniluoto, I. (2017) “Optimistic realism about scientific progress”, Synthese, 194(9), 3291-3309.
-       Orman, T. F. (2016) “Paradigm” as a central concept in Thomas Kuhn’s thought”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 6(10), 47-52.
-       Park, S. (2018) “Can Kuhn’s taxonomic incommensurability be an image of science?” The Kuhnian image of science: time for a decisive transformation, 61-74.
-       Politi, V. (2019) “Specialization and The Incommensurability Among Scientific Specialties”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 50(1), 129-144.
-       Prelević, D. (2019) “Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: Good Examples Still to Be Found”, Filozofia Nauki, 27(4 (108)), 61-77.
-       Roselli, A. (2018) “Realists Waiting for Godot? The Verisimilitudinarian and the Cumulative Approach to Scientific Progress”, Erkenntnis, 1-14.
-       Shan, Y. (2019) “A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress”, Philosophy of Science, 86(4), 739-758.
-       Shan, Y. (2020) “Kuhn’s “wrong turning” and legacy today”, Synthese, 197(1), 381-406.
-       Yucel, R. (2018) “Scientists’ Ontological and Epistemological Views about Science from the Perspective of Critical Realism”, Science & Education, 27(5-6), 407-433.
Send comment about this article
CAPTCHA Image

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics