Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی


1 دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، ایران

2 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی. ایران.


رویکرد «کارکردگرا» رویکردی معیار در دهه‎های اخیر در فلسفة ذهن و علوم ‎شناختی است که با الهام از علوم کامپیوتر و در مقابل انتقادهای وارد بر نظریات پیشین شکل گرفت و مغز را سامانه پردازشگری می‌داند که داده‎های حاصل از اشیاء و رویدادها را دریافت و به‌ کمک مفاهیم پیشینیِ ذهن انسان، آنها را در قالب علائم و نمادهایی با کارکرد بازنمایانه ترجمه و ذخیره می‌کند؛ اما این رویکرد به ‌لحاظ فلسفی با مشکلاتی همچون توجیه معناداری مفاهیم روبه‌روست. این مقاله با نگاهی تحلیلی می‌کوشد رویکرد «بدن‌مند» را به ‌عنوان رویکردی جایگزین ناظر به حل این مشکلات ارائه کند.
نگاه بدن‌مند، مشکلات کارکردگرایی را ناشی از نگاه ماشین‎وار، منفعل و فرمان‌بَرِ آن به بدن می‌داند و به‌جای آن، ذهن بدن‌مند را با سه جزء معرفی می‌کند: 1. سامانه «ادراکی-حرکتی» که به ‌نوعی حضور مابازائی از اشیای خارجی را در ذهن معنادار می‌سازد؛ 2. سامانه «مفهوم‎سازی» که اطلاعات حاصل از سامانه ادراکی-حرکتی را به هم مرتبط و متحد می‌سازد. 3. فرایند «ساخت استعاره»‌هایی که حاصل سامانه مفهوم‎سازی هستند و در زبان روزمره، فرازبان و مفاهیم ریاضی به ‌وفور دیده می‎شوند. این سه فرایند شناختی ذهن ما اغلب ناآگاهانه‌اند. نشان داده‌ایم که نگاه بدن‌مند به ذهن، آن را به مغز فرو نمی‌کاهد، بدن را صرفاً سخت‌افزاری فرمان‌بر و مغز را فرمانده و پردازشگر داده‎های ادراکی نمی‌بیند و مفاهیم را هم نه بازنمایی‎های نمادین از جهان بلکه شبیه‎سازهایی ذهنی از کیفیات حاصل از «تعامل بدن با جهان» می‌بیند. انسان (با تمام جنبه‎های وجودی‎اش) موجودی «در جهان» است و به ‌عنوان «بخشی از جهان» با پیرامون خود در تعامل است و شکل‌گیری هر معنایی در ذهن محصول همین تعامل است. 



عنوان مقاله [English]

From Functionalism to Embodiment in Philosophy of Mind

نویسندگان [English]

  • Tohid Hadinejad 1
  • Mahdi Behniafar 2

1 MA of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Iran

2 Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Iran

چکیده [English]

In recent decades, Functionalism has become a standard approach towards philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Functionalism is inspired by computer science and against prior theories about mind. Functionalism takes mind as a processor and body as a provider of raw data for this processor. Mind with the help of mental algorithms translates perceptional data to symbolic representations as concepts of objects and events. According to some philosophers, this leads to problems like the problem of meaning. In this paper, with an analytical approach, Embodiment is proposed as a solution to these problems. According to Embodied Mind, regarding the body as a mere machine is the root of all problems in Functionalism. Embodied mind is consisting of three pars: 1. Perception-Motor system which presents meaningful perception of objects and events to the mind. 2. Conceptualization system which unites information provided by perception-motor system. 3. Metaphors, processes in mind, which enable us to think and talk about everyday and mathematical concepts and meta-language. These are processes, mainly unconscious, in mind for understanding concepts. Embodied Mind rejects the idea of body as mere machine and mind as a brain processes. It also rejects symbolic representations as concepts. Concepts are simulators of objects and events, rooting in interaction between body and the world. Human as an Embodied Being exist in the world and interact with it and this is what makes sense of concepts in mind.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • embodiment
  • perception-motor system
  • conceptual system
  • metaphor
  • symbolic representations
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