(university of Tabriz)The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه مطالعات نظری علم، فناوری و نوآوری، مرکز تحقیقات سیاست علمی کشور، تهران، ایران.

10.22034/jpiut.2022.47592.2948

چکیده

بیشترِ فیزیکالیست‌ها بر این باورند که فیزیکالیسم دیدگاهی است که اساساً وجود ذهنیت بنیادی را چه در قالب جوهر و چه در قالب ویژگی رد می‌کند. بنابراین، با توجه به این‌که فیزیکالیست‌ها عمدتاً از پسینی بودن فیزیکالیسم نیز دفاع می‌کنند، به نظر آن‌ها اگر در نظریه علمیِ (فیزیکیِ) آینده، ذهنیت بنیادی به عنوان مفهومی فیزیکی پذیرفته شود، فیزیکالیسم اِبطال خواهد شد. در مقابل، برخی فیلسوفان هم هستند که باور دارند که هسته اصلیِ فیزیکالیسم تسلیم بودن در برابر متافیزیکِ علم (مخصوصاً فیزیک) است؛ آن‌چه می‌توان آن را علم‌گرایی خواند و ربط وثیقی با طبیعت‌گراییِ روش‌شناختی دارد. از این‌رو، طبق نظر این گروه، اگر فیزیک‌دانان در آینده، ذهنیت بنیادی را به عنوان بخشی از نظریه فیزیکی بپذیرند، فیزیکالیسم اِبطال نمی‌شود و فیزیکالیست‌ها به طور سازگار ذهنیت بنیادی را به عنوان امری فیزیکی خواهند پذیرفت (یا باید چنین کنند). در این مقاله، استدلال می‌کنم که شواهد تاریخی به‌نفعِ تلقی دوم از فیزیکالیسم است. نخست، برخی شواهد تاریخی را برمی‌شمرم که به نظر می‌رسد نشان می‌دهند که ریشه تاریخیِ فیزیکالیسم، شکست آن دسته از تبیین‌ها – شبه‌تبیین‌ها – بوده است که با توسل به هستنده‌های غیرفیزیکیِ فوق‌طبیعی عرضه می‌شده‌اند. دوم، نشان می‌دهم که در برخی از نخستین تحلیل‌های مادی‌گرایی –سَلَف تاریخیِ فیزیکالیسم– در ابتدای قرن بیستم، فیلسوفان این دیدگاه را در سایه همان ریشه تاریخیِ مذکور می‌فهمیده‌اند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Naturalism or Ontological Significance? Physicalism and Fundamental Mentality: a historical approach

نویسنده [English]

  • Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht

Assistant Professor of Theory-Oriented STI Studies Department, National Research Institute for Science Policy (NRISP), Tehran, Iran.

چکیده [English]

Most physicalists believe that physicalism is a thesis that denies the existence of fundamental mentality either as a substance or as a property. Therefore, since most physicalists also endorse a posteriori physicalism, according to them, if the future physical theory posits fundamental mentality as a fundamental physical concept, then physicalism will be falsified. In contrast, there are those who believe that the core idea of physicalism is an ontological deference to science (especially physics); the idea that is usually called scientism and is closely related to methodological naturalism. According to them, if physicists posit fundamental mentality as an integral part of the future fundamental physical theory, physicalism will not be falsified, and physicalists may (or should) accept fundamental mentality as a genuine physical concept. In this paper, I argue that there is some historical evidence in support of the latter understanding of physicalism. First, I give some historical evidence that seems to suggest that the historical origin of physicalism is the failure of those explanations – or pseudo-explanations – that have appealed to supernatural non-physical entities. Second, I show that in some of the initial reflections on materialism – the predecessor of physicalism – in the first half of the twentieth century, philosophers understood materialism in terms of the very historical origin.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • physicalism
  • methodological naturalism
  • fundamental mentality
  • pseudo-explanans
  • god-of-the-gaps
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