Haecceitism and Essentialism: Identity and Distingtion

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Candidate of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University of Qazvin, Iran

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy and Wisdom Department, Imam Khomeini International University of Qazvin, Iran

Abstract

Essentialism and Haecceitism are theories to explain the issue of individuality in objects. Some philosophers consider these two schools of philosophy to be one, and others oppose this idea. In this regard, it seems that essentialism and Haecceitism can not be considered as one, because Essentialism in its strongest forms, such as Origen essentialism, seeks to solve the problem of individuality in objects through individual essence, and Haecceitism seeks to explain this problem through the Haecceity. Both views provide explanations to justify their claim, and challenge the other point of view and perspective. In this article, by explaining and criticizing the views of the followers of essentialism and Haecceitism, it has reached the general evaluation that it seems that Haecceitism has been more successful in proving its approach or in criticizing the Haecceitism by presenting more and stronger arguments and in justifying individuality for possible objects. It is more acceptable.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 17, Issue 43 - Serial Number 43
Articles
2023
Pages 650-673

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