Examining the Concept of Mind and the Status of Reason in Hume's Belief on Causality with a Naturalistic Approach

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Iran

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Isfahan, Iran

Abstract

In discussing Hume's view of causality, it has been generally focused on its negative aspects and skeptical results. Whereas, according to naturalistic interpretation, Hume's purpose is to illustrate the nature of human beings and to determine the limits of human understanding. Hume's aim is not to philosophically reject the belief in causally connected, but rather to criticize the sort of philosophical thinking that claim to rationalize them. In this paper, the author intends to provide first the naturalistic explanation of Hume’s causality discussion, relying on Kemp Smith's unprecedented interpretation. In explanation kemp smith provided for the functioning of human mind, the origin of the necessary connection idea is an inner feeling that is generalized to reality, and the belief in causality cannot be proved by any argument. The emotional origin of belief in causality, which is not based on reason, is a serious challenge in its acceptance and justification. Therfore the second and main purpose of this article is to examine the mental origin of the necessary connection, then the concept of reason is evaluated from Hume's view to clarify in what sense belief in causality cannot be based on reason.

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References

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