Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی


دکتری فلسفه غرب، مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران، ایران.


بنا به چشم‌­اندازگرایی نویی، اعیان پایه­ای تجربه­ ادراکی ویژگی‌­های چشم‌­اندازی منظره، در تمایز با ویژگی‌های واقعی آن، هستند. این مفهوم از چشم­‌اندازگرایی قرابتی با آموزه‌­های نظریّه داده حسّی دارد. این قرابت، نتیجه پذیرش ایده اصلی نظریّه داده حسّی توسّط نویی است: ویژگی­‌های چشم‌­اندازی به لحاظ ادراکی پایه‌­ای هستند. با این حال نویی با اصلاح بنیادین این ویژگی­‌های چشم‌­اندازی تلاش کرده است تا از نظریّه خود برابر مشکلات متعدّد نظریّه داده حسّی حفاظت کند. ویژگی‌­های چشم‌­اندازی نویی عینی هستند نه ذهنی. نشان داده می­‌شود که این اصلاح کارا نیست. استنتاج «آنچه ما می­‌بینیم چشم‌اندازی از یک منظره است» از «ما آن منظره را از یک چشم‌­انداز خاص می­‌بینم» ضرورتاً صادق نیست. هم­چنین این چشم‌­اندازگرایی با پدیدارشناسی متعارف تجربه ادراکی ناسازگار است. در تجربه ادراکی متداول ویژگی­‌های چشم­‌اندازی دیده نمی‌­شوند؛ بلکه آنها در نهایت با تمرکز و تمرین تشخیص داده می­‌شوند. در نهایت این که شواهد تجربی نیز چشم‌­اندازگرایی نویی را رد می­‌کنند.



عنوان مقاله [English]

Against Noë’s Perspectivism

نویسنده [English]

  • Faraz Attar

Ph.D. of Western Philosophy, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Iran

چکیده [English]

According to Noë’s perspectivism, the basic objects of perceptual experiences are perspectival properties of a scene, rather than their actual properties. This concept of perspectivism shares a same core with sense datum theory. The core is the result of Noë’s accepting sense datum theory’s main idea: perspectival properties are perceptually basic. However, Noë, by fundamental modification of perspectival properties, tries to secure his theory against certain problems of sense datum theory. Although, according to sense datum theory, objects of perception are subjective, Noë’s perspectival properties are objective. I argue that the modification is not enough. Inferring “I see perspectival properties of a scene” from “I see the scene from a certain perspective” is not necessarily true. Furthermore, the perspectivism is inconsistent with ordinary phenomenology of perceptual experience. In common perceptual experiences, it is not the case that perspectival properties are always seen. But they are eventually recognized with focus and practice. At the end, empirical evidences refute Noë’s perspectivism.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • perspectivism
  • P-properties
  • Alva Noë
  • sensorimotor contingency approach
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