An Analysis of Kant's Viewpoint on the Criterion of Moral Value Based on Henson and Herman's Interpretations

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies Department, University of Isfahan, Iran

Abstract

Kant argues that an action is morally worthy only if it is done not from inclination or self-interest but from duty. In the Groundwork, he provides examples to illustrate that the presence of motives aligned with duty undermines the moral value of an action. These viewpoints have sparked significant controversy, particularly in light of the resurgence of virtue-ethics in recent years. Notably, the work of two famous Kantian philosophers, Richard Hanson and Barbara Herman, are especially remarkable as they provide an enlightening interpretation of Kant's perspective and address the raised concerns. While Hanson outlines two innovative models for the conditions of action, he also identifies the relevant phenomenon of overdetermination and states that an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Furthermore, Herman complements these models by introducing a third one and arguing that an action maintains its moral value if it necessitates both duty and if its primary motive is the motive of duty, regardless of whether it reflects the agent's desires or not. In this paper, we assess the strength and effectiveness of these models by examining Kant's examples. Consequently, despite shedding light on Kant's intentions, these accounts do not significantly contribute to resolving the existing ambiguities. Critics can express concerns regarding the simplification of the overdetermination, the fallacy of circular and tautology. A thorough examination of Kant's philosophy reveals that fulfilling one's duty and disregarding other motivations are essential for the development of an individual's moral character.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 17, Issue 44 - Serial Number 44
Articles
2023
Pages 766-786

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