Rethinking The Lockean Approach to The Problem of Personal Identity

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. of Philosophy, University of Benin, Nigeria

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Nigeria

Abstract

The problem of personal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic problem of personal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for personal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for personal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving personal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of personal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of personal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just another way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the problem of personal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the problem of personal identity.

Keywords

References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 17, Issue 45 - Serial Number 45
Articles
2024
Pages 231-249

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