Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Alireza Zamiri ¹
• Aَhmad Fazeli ²
• Hassan Fathzadeh ³

¹ Ph.D., Department of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

² Associate Professor, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

³ Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Zanjan, Zanjan, Iran.

Abstract

Non-intentional and immediate awareness has no already relationship with the other. While freedom is always related to others and not having a relationship with others does not fundamentally interfere with freedom. Therefore, freedom is never a question of knowledge. Consciousness in itself and for itself independently and unmediated by external objects internally projects its objectivity. This consciousness-based approach basically does not look outside itself, that is, it finds the origin and idea of ​​truth inside and without the mediation of others. The other is a competitor of freedom in all its forms in the sense that it does not allow any linguistic articulation to form outside its limits and swallows all the illusory elements of self-foundation. At the same time, there is no other way than facing the other towards a kind of reflexive awareness and knowing oneself as an ego. In addition, the link between freedom and moral responsibility is one of the most fundamental and long-standing topics of ethics, which establishes a link between the subject, the other, and agency. Kant's transcendental freedom constructs space as a support for empirical freedom and as a condition for the possibility of experiencing freedom. From this point of view, transcendental and unconscious freedom play the same role in relation to moral responsibility.

Keywords

• Kant
• Lacan
• transcendental freedom
• moral responsibility
• the other