Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Assistant Professor in Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University
Abstract
The unpreceded abilities of AI technologies have led to the emergence of new ethical issues; among them is the possibility of moral agency of AI artefacts. There are many questions around this subject, including what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of being a moral agent? How can we examine those conditions in artefacts? What levels and degrees of agency are possible for artefacts? And what level of moral agency is proper for allocating a certain task to AI artefacts? There are wide discussions about factors that figure in the moral capacities of AI artefacts, and emotions are one of the frequently referred factors that directly or indirectly are relevant for examining their moral status. In this paper, we focus on the relation of emotions and moral capacities in AI technologies. Our main question Is whether emotions play a positive role in the improvement of moral capacities or a negative role. We extract and articulate four arguments in defense of the positive role of emotions in the improvement of AI moral capacities including arguments from moral sensitivity, bounded rationality, risk assessment, and culpability. Then, we present other four arguments in defense of the negative role of emotions in moral capacities including arguments from emotional hijacking, deceptive emotions, anthropomorphism and dehumanization paradox, and moral deskilling. Finally, we analyze the debate by clarifying the point of contests between the two mentioned camps and discuss about serious challenges of designing emotional AI.
Keywords
- Emotions
- Emotions and Morality
- Artificial Moral Agency
- Artificial Intelligence Ethics
- Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
Main Subjects
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