مجله پژوهش های فلسفی

Journal of Philosophical Investigations

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ارزیابی و تحلیل دیدگاه ذهنِ بدن‌مند

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفۀ معاصر، دانشگاه بین‎المللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران

2 استاد گروه فلسفۀ دانشگاه بین‎المللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران

3 دانشیار گروه فلسفۀ دانشگاه بین‎المللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران

چکیده

این مقاله با نگاهی به رویکردهای نابدن‎مند به ذهن، به بررسی دیدگاه ذهنِ بدن‎مند می‎پردازد. برپایۀ رویکردهای نابدن‎مند به ذهن، بدن در شکل‎گیری ذهن هیچ نقش بنیادینی ندارد. ذهن و بدن دو چیز متفاوت هستند. این تفاوت گاه هستی‎شناختی و گاه مبتنی بر ویژگی و خصلت است. در این رویکردها، بدن به‎عنوان بستر، ابزار، تحقق‎دهندۀ عصبی، و ظرف نگریسته می‎شود. دربرابر چنین رویکردی، بدن‎مندیِ ذهن بر این نظر است که ذهن، ذاتاً بدن‎مند است. بدن، ذهن را شکل می‎دهد. ذهن و بدن دو چیز نیستند، بلکه یک چیزاند. مفاهیم، افکار، عواطف و روی‎هم‎رفته، حالات و فرآیندهای ذهنی، ازاساس بدن‎مند هستند. بدین‎معنی که بدن در شکل‎گیری آن‎ها نقش محوری دارد. در این رویکرد، بدن شکل‎دهنده است و نه بستر یا ابزار. آنچه موید این دیدگاه است، دسته‎ای از یافته‎های تجربی و علوم شناختی است. برپایۀ این یافته‎ها، مغز، بدن، و محیط پیرامون، باهم سامانه‎ای پویا را شکل می‎دهند که ذهن و شناخت پیامدی از این سامانۀ پویا هستند. این رویکرد تنها بر توضیح یا تبیین صرف مبتنی نیست، بلکه ذهن بدن‎مند، پیامد رویکردی میان‎رشته‎ای است که توسط شواهد و یافته‎های متعدد تجربی پشتیبانی می‎شود. باوجوداین، انتقاداتی به این رویکرد نیز وجود دارد. مهمترین انتقادات به ابهام در اصول اساسی، ناکافی بودن شواهد تجربی، عدم توجه به فرایندهای شناختیِ سطح بالا، و تقلیل تمام حالات ذهنی به حالات بدنی، اشاره دارند. در این مقاله می‎کوشیم تا این دیدگاه را مورد تحلیل و ارزیابی قرار دهیم.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Evaluation and Analysis of the Embodied Mind Perspective

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohamad-Mahdi Moghadas 1
  • Ali Fath-Taheri 2
  • Abdul-Razzaq Hesamifar 2
  • Shirzad Peik-Herfeh 3

1 Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

چکیده [English]

This paper evaluates the embodied mind perspective in light of disembodied approaches to the mind. According to disembodied approaches, the body plays no fundamental role in constituting the mind. Mind and body are considered two distinct entities. This distinction is sometimes ontological and sometimes based on properties or characteristics. In these approaches, the body is described as a substrate, tool, neural realization, or container. In contrast, the embodied mind perspective argues that the mind is inherently embodied. The body constitutes the mind. Mind and body are not two distinct entities, but rather a single entity. Concepts, thoughts, emotions, and in sum, mental states and processes are fundamentally embodied. This means that the body plays a pivotal role in their formation. In this perspective, the body is the constitutive, not the substrate or tool. What supports this approach is a collection of empirical and cognitive findings. Based on these findings, the brain, body, and the surrounding environment together form a dynamic system, and mind and cognition are the consequences of this dynamic system. This approach is not merely about description or explanation; rather, the embodied mind is the outcome of an interdisciplinary approach that is supported by numerous empirical findings. However, this approach is not without its criticisms. The most prominent critiques highlight several key issues, including ambiguities in its fundamental principles, a lack of empirical evidence, insufficient consideration of higher-order cognitive processes, and the reductionist tendency to reduce all mental states to physical states. In this paper, we seek to critically analyze and evaluate this perspective, examining its theoretical underpinnings within the broader academic discourse.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Embodied Mind
  • Mind
  • Cognition
  • Cognitive Science
  • Enaction
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