The Self in Prereflexive Self-Consciousness: Self-Concernment without Self-Reference

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

2 Lecturer of Philosophy Department, Federal University from Rio de Janeiro/UFRJ/CNPQ, Brazil

Abstract

This paper aims to explain the phenomenological concept of prereflexive self-consciousness in positive and constructive terms, using minimal analytical tools. The first step in this direction is the adoption of an adverbial theory of self-consciousness, inspired by the adverbial theory of perception. The adverbial theory of perception replaces the controversial sense-data theory of perception. We do not see a "blue sense datum" but rather perceive something "in a blue-like manner." By analogy, we propose that prereflexive intransitive self-consciousness is not a representation of the thinking or perceiving subject. Instead, prereflexive self-consciousness is a peculiar way in which the subject performs an act of thinking or perceiving. The second step is to use Perry's framework of the "unarticulated constituent" to further clarify this claim. However, we will not rely on Perry's original view but on Recanati's critical review. We will argue that the adverbial characterization of prereflexive self-consciousness as "the first-person way of experiencing or thinking" means that the subjectless content of one's representation must be assessed within a broad context to which the subject necessarily belongs. This is what we call "self-concernment without self-reference." 

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 56 - Serial Number 56
Articles
October 2026
Pages 525-540

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