The Moral Status of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of the Easy and Hard Problem of Consciousness

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Candidate of Moral Philosophy, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran

2 Assistant Professor of Department of Moral Philosphy, University of Religions and Denomenations, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

Consciousness is one of the most fundamental yet complex issues in the philosophy of mind. Philosophers such as David Chalmers, by proposing the “hard problem of consciousness,” have distinguished between phenomenal consciousness and psychological consciousness. Ned Block has further refined this distinction by formulating it in terms of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. On the other hand, John Searle, by differentiating between the first-person and third-person perspectives, and Thomas Nagel, by emphasizing the subjective character of experience, have analyzed this duality from different angles. Although these classifications appear diverse, they all point to the fundamental distinction between inner experience and behavioral or cognitive capacities. The present article, focusing on this essential distinction, examines the question of whether artificial intelligence can possess phenomenal consciousness or merely exhibits psychological consciousness. Answering this question has significant philosophical and ethical implications, as phenomenal consciousness is directly linked to experiences of pain, pleasure, and suffering, and is considered a foundation for many moral rights. This study, adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, argues that the distinction between types of consciousness can serve as a basis for determining different degrees of moral status. For instance, beings endowed with access consciousness but lacking phenomenal experience may be entitled to functional autonomy, yet not to the right not to suffer. In contrast, infants and animals, due to their inner experience, are deemed deserving of the right not to suffer, even if they lack advanced cognitive abilities.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 19, Issue 52 - Serial Number 52
Articles
52 Autumn 2025
November 2025
Pages 259-280

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