Moral Agency and Aesthetic Creativity within the Framework of Kantian Consciousness of Self-Activity

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Yasuj, Yasuj, Iran

2 M.A. Student of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Descartes grounded modern epistemology in the thinking subject, while Hume denied the enduring self, viewing it as a collection of fleeting perceptions. Though Hume’s critique dismantled Cartesian assumptions, it also opened the path for Kant’s redefinition of the self on rational grounds. This article explores how the self, despite losing its presumed original unity, retains its essential role in volition and experience. Kant’s critical philosophy reveals that the spontaneity of the subject—irreducible to causal explanation—requires investigation within practical reason and aesthetic judgment. Beginning with purposiveness as the basis for reflective judgment, the self emerges as a cognitive, moral, and artistic agent. It synthesizes sensory input to form knowledge, legislates moral norms through free will, and expresses creative force in aesthetic production. By integrating Kant’s critiques into a unified framework, this interpretation shows that post-Kantian philosophy no longer treats the self as a fixed entity, but as a dynamic, future-oriented agent of self-activity. The transcendental ego, though not an object of knowledge, functions as the condition for cognition, moral autonomy, and aesthetic creativity—marking a shift from metaphysical substance to active principle. 

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

Alison, H. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
Alison. H. (2015). Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Allias, L. (2024). Autonomy and Freedom., In A. Gomes & A. Stephenson (Eds.) Kant (The Oxford Handbook). Oxford University Press.
Berkeley, G. (1992). De Motu and The Analyst (D. M. Jessep, Ed.). Dordrecht, Netherlands, Springer Science + Business Media, B.V.
Berkeley, G. (2009). A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Prodby; Col Choat. Project Gutenberg
Bettcher, T. M. (2009). Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind, (J. Miller, Ed.). Springer.
Boyle, M. (2024). Consciousness and self-Consciousness. In A. Gomes & A. Stephenson (Eds.), Kant (The Oxford Handbook). Oxford University Press.
Brook, A. (1994). Kant and the mind. Cambridge University Press.
Buroker, Jill Vance. (2006). Kant's Critique of Pure Reason an Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Creighton, J. E. (1897). Is the Transcendental Ego an Unmeaning Conception? The Philosophical Review, 6(2): 162-169. (8 pages)
Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations on First Philosophy. In John Cottingham (Tran). Cambridge University Press.
Frierson, P. (2013). Kant’s Questions: What is Human Being? New York, Routledge.
Heoppner, T. (2022). Kant’s transcendental deduction and the theory of apperception (G. Motta, D. Schulting, & U. Thiel, Eds.). De Gruyter.
Hume, D. (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature: Volume 1: Texts (D. F. Norton & M. J. Norton, Eds.). Oxford University Press.
Kahn, C. H. (1992). Aristotle on Thinking, In M. C. Nussbaum & A. O. Rorty (Eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (pp. 359–380). Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Kant, I. (1997). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer & A. Wood, Eds.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1781/1787)
Kant, I. (2000). Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2004). Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translation, A. Rashidian. Tehran, Ney. (in Persian).
Kant, I. (2006). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Trans. R. B. Louden). Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2011). Correspondence (Trans. & Eds. A. Zweig). Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2012a). Lectures on Logic (Ed.J. Michael Young). Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2012b). Critique of practical reason. In I, Kant. Practical Philosophy. (A. W. Wood, Trans.) (pp. 133–273). Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, I. (2012b). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In I, Kant. Practical Philosophy. (A. W. Wood, Trans.) (pp. 37–109). Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, I. (2012c). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by B. Nazari & M. M. Ardebili. Tehran, Qoqnoos. (in Persian).
Kant, I. (2013). Lectures on Anthropology (A. W. Wood, Ed.; R. R. Clewis, R. B. Louden, G. F. Munzel, & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2018). Anthropology from a Practical Perspective. Translated by A. Foladi. Tehran, Farhang-e Moaser. (in Persian).
Karus, K. (2020). Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation: The nature of inner experience. Cambridge University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1982). Kant's Paralogisms, The Philosophical Review, 91(4), 515–547.
Kitcher, P. (2008). Kant's Thinker. Oxford University Press.
Lock, J. (1999). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (trans. Jim mains). The Pennsylvania State University press.
Makkuel, A. R. (2013). Self-Cognition and Self-Assessment. In A. Cohen (Eds.), Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
Mendus, S. (1983). Kant’s Doctrine of the Self, Kant Studies.
Omid, M. & Hassanpoor, B. (2019). Negative Attitude on Transcendental Ego in Kant. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 13(27), 51-70. https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2019.29716.2130. (in Persian).
Omid, M. & Hassanpoor, B. (2019). The Functions of Transcendental Ego in Kant's Epistemology. Wisdom and Philosophy, 15(59), 33-61. https://doi.org/10.22054/wph.2019.37482.1650. (in Persian).
Pasnau, R. (2002). Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89. Cambridge University Press.
Pope, A. (2016). An Essay on Man (Trans. T. Jones). Princeton University Press. 
Proops, I. (2021). The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant’s Dialectic. Oxford University Press.
Schulting, D. (2017). Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. Palgrave Macmillan.
Thiel, U. (2011). The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume. Oxford University Press.
Send comment about this article
CAPTCHA Image
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 19, Issue 52 - Serial Number 52
Articles
52 Autumn 2025
November 2025
Pages 429-448

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics