Pyrrhonian Skepticism: the perpetual quest for truth or the everlasting suspension of judgment? (toward a solution to the problem of inquiry in sextus empiricus)

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Candidate . Department of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

3 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

Abstract

This paper investigates a tension in PH I.1–2 and 28–29. In the first passage, the Pyrrhonian skeptic is portrayed as one who “continues” inquiry in pursuit of truth; in the latter, however, he is said to abandon inquiry unexpectedly upon arriving at an unforeseen endpoint: epoché (suspension of judgment) together with its accompanying state of ataraxia (tranquility). At first glance, these accounts seem to imply that the Pyrrhonist both persists in endless inquiry and yet brings inquiry to a halt once tranquility is achieved. Some scholars maintain that Pyrrhonian inquiry is not a form of philosophical investigation in the ordinary sense: its aim is not truth but tranquility, and the skeptic therefore abandons the pursuit of truth once suspension of judgment seems sufficient for peace of mind. Others, by contrast, argue that the inquiry must remain truth-directed, since without such an orientation suspension of judgment would lose its significance and tranquility could not be attained. We argue that the ataraxia accompanying suspension of judgment is not identical to the tranquility originally sought by the Pyrrhonist. The alleged tension, therefore, stems from a conflation of two distinct senses of ataraxia.

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Pyrrhonian Skepticism: the perpetual quest for truth or the everlasting suspension of judgment? (toward a solution to the problem of inquiry in sextus empiricus)

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 55 - Serial Number 55
Articles
Issue 55, Summer 2026
July 2026
Pages 519-540

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