AI Companionship and the Development of Moral Agency: An Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Perspective

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.

Abstract

Artificial intelligence companions are becoming increasingly integrated into everyday human life, raising important philosophical questions about their influence on moral development. Existing discussions have often focused either on the practical benefits of AI companionship or on its potential social and psychological risks. Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the developmental processes through which sustained interaction with AI may shape the formation of moral character. This article examines AI companionship through the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics and contemporary ethical naturalism. It argues that the ethical significance of AI companionship cannot be adequately assessed solely by reference to immediate behavioral outcomes or emotional consequences. Instead, its moral implications should be evaluated in light of the developmental conditions through which moral agency is cultivated. The article further argues that this perspective does not require viewing AI companionship as inherently detrimental. Rather, AI systems may also contribute positively to moral development when they are designed to cultivate reflective agency, encourage moral practice, and support—rather than replace—the interpersonal conditions necessary for the formation of virtue. By integrating Aristotelian virtue ethics, ethical naturalism, and contemporary discussions of AI companionship, this article offers a balanced philosophical framework for evaluating both the risks and the developmental possibilities of AI-mediated relationships.

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AI Companionship and the Development of Moral Agency: An Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Perspective

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 56 - Serial Number 56
Articles
Issue 56, Autumn 2026
October 2026
Pages 217-230

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