In this paper, Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of science is discussed in the light of contemporary science. Even though Kant rejects all “proud ontologies” or dogmatic metaphysics, he did allow for the use of regulative reason to formulate a metaphysics (often said to be “problematically assumed”). The antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Teleological Judgment are used as a point of departure to develop a concise formulation of his critical metaphysics. The question under consideration is to what extent Kant's critical metaphysics, which can be used to formulate a speculative or theoretical model or hypothesis on par with other mathematical or scientific models describing the workings of the universe, has been borne out to be correct when measured against the progress of science. An assessment is made as to what extent Kant’s metaphysics has been borne out to be correct in the progress of science.
McLoud, W. (2026). Kant, Metaphysics and the Progress of Science. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, (), -. doi: 10.22034/jpiut.2026.72441.4509
MLA
McLoud, W. . "Kant, Metaphysics and the Progress of Science", Journal of Philosophical Investigations, , , 2026, -. doi: 10.22034/jpiut.2026.72441.4509
HARVARD
McLoud, W. (2026). 'Kant, Metaphysics and the Progress of Science', Journal of Philosophical Investigations, (), pp. -. doi: 10.22034/jpiut.2026.72441.4509
CHICAGO
W. McLoud, "Kant, Metaphysics and the Progress of Science," Journal of Philosophical Investigations, (2026): -, doi: 10.22034/jpiut.2026.72441.4509
VANCOUVER
McLoud, W. Kant, Metaphysics and the Progress of Science. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 2026; (): -. doi: 10.22034/jpiut.2026.72441.4509
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