AI and Ultimate Responsibility: Reinterpreting Robert Kane's Theory of Moral Responsibility

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Professor,, Department of Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

Abstract

The increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human decision-making has raised questions about the adequacy of theories of moral responsibility. This article examines whether Robert Kane's libertarian theory remains an adequate framework for explaining moral responsibility under AI-mediated conditions. Using an analytical–philosophical method, the study evaluates Kane's central concepts of Ultimate Responsibility, Self-Forming Actions, and reflective control. The analysis argues that AI does not eliminate responsibility because Kane's account depends on autonomous agency rather than the absence of technological assistance. However, AI transforms the conditions under which responsibility is exercised and requires reinterpretation of these concepts within technologically mediated environments. The study argues that decisions concerning reliance on, evaluation of, and oversight over AI systems may constitute contemporary forms of Self-Forming Actions because they involve reflective judgments contributing to moral self-formation. Human agents remain the ultimate bearers of responsibility as long as they retain the capacity for critical deliberation, endorsement, rejection, and revision of algorithmic recommendations. Accordingly, this article argues that if future AI systems were to undermine these fundamental conditions of human agency, the resulting challenge would extend beyond Kane's libertarian framework to broader theories of moral responsibility. The article concludes that Kane's framework remains valuable for understanding responsibility in the age of artificial intelligence.

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AI and Ultimate Responsibility: Reinterpreting Robert Kane's Theory of Moral Responsibility

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 56 - Serial Number 56
Articles
Issue 56, Autumn 2026
October 2026
Pages 151-174

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