Rorty’s Portrait of Pragmatism

According to the classical pragmatists, philosophy ought not to be about finding transcendent answers that point to something beyond humanity but something contingent, finite, and very human. Richard Rorty picks up where the classical pragmatists left off and, using updated tools in analytic philosophy from those like Quine and Davidson, manages to use philosophy against itself and questions the validity of the entire field. The result of this inquiry will lead to some of the great American philosopher’s central points: picking up the anti-representationalism of the classical pragmatists, arguing that the field of epistemology along with the dreams of finding an objective foundation should disappear (in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979/2009)), what philosophy would be like without such foundations, and how this flavor of pragmatism is connected to liberal democracy (in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999)). What this idea means in regard to Rorty’s vision of philosophy and politics will be the core of this essay. Its goal is to elucidate Rorty’s contribution to both fields, and if the reader walks away from this piece with a better, well-rounded conception of Rorty’s project, then this essay will have succeeded. Of course, no great thinker is without their flaws, and to properly understand such a philosopher is to not only understand what they stood for, but also the limitations of their ideas. For that reason, while some of Rorty’s central points will be illuminated, a brief criticism will also be given. At its end, the portrait of Rorty’s pragmatism will, by its own virtue, prove to be a profound contribution to the humanities that will serve as a source of inspiration for quite some time.