Simple-If Question and Essence’s Being Existent; Mullā Sadrā v.s. Mīr Dāmād

Abstract
 Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. If existence, he argues, were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions. It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent: first that existence is an analytical property for essence; second that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one; and third that essence is a property of existence. In this paper, I will argue that the first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument and then it would be in contrary with Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence, unless this account is augmented with the third one. The third account, however, can evade the argument. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence.
Keywords: existence, to be existent, simple-if question, compound-if question, property.
 
 
 
1.    Introductıon
In al-’Ufuq al-Mubīn (1391H, 59) Mīr Dāmād claims that not all predicates of a subject manifest a real property for that subject. A real property of a subject is something which is superadded to the subject. Examples include a body’s being red or a body’s being above another body. In such cases, the predicates correspond with some feature of the subjects which are not the same as those subjects, in reality. This is opposed to the body’s being itself, for example. In this case, the body itself is not something which is superadded to the body.

2.    Mīr dāmād agaınst the realıty of exıstence
The controversial example is essence’s being existent. Is the existence of an essence something superadded to the essence? In Mīr Dāmād’s words, is existence a real property for essence? Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt (1367H, 37) argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. For this end, he notifies that there is a distinction between propositions that is parallel to the distinction between real and non-real properties. If P is a real property for a, then the proposition that a is P is a compound-if proposition. On the other hand, it is a commonplace that the only example of simple-if propositions is one that contains existence as its predicate. Now, he continues, suppose that existence is a real property. Then, the proposition that a exists would become a compound-if proposition. But this contradicts the well-established premise that the proposition that a exists is a simple-if proposition. Consequently, he argues, if existence were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions.
The major problem that Mīr Dāmād is dealing with is how to explain essence’s being existent. His view is that, in reality, essence’s being existent is nothing but the essence itself. He, then, goes a step forward and claims that existence is nothing in reality. We only have the concept of existence in our minds. With these moves Mīr Dāmād, in some sense, resolves the problem of the relationship between essence and existence, in reality.

3.    Mullā sadrā on the relatıonshıp between exıstence and essence
It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā, Mīr Dāmād’s pupil, was in disagreement with the teacher with respect to the reality of existence (1981). He believes that existence is a real entity in the world as opposed to essence. So, he should explain how essence is existent. Actually, he has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent (1302H; 1363H). Mullā Sadrā’s first account is that existence is an analytical property for essence. He defines analytical property as the following: P is an analytic property for a iff a cannot be but not has P. Mullā Sadrā’s second explanation is that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one. His third thesis is that essence is a property of existence.

4.    Mullā sadrā v.s. mīr dāmād
My major concern in this paper is this problem: which of these three accounts for essence’s being existent offered by Mullā Sadrā can overcome Mīr Dāmād’s seminal argument? The first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument, since, any kind of real property, whether it is analytical or not, are associated with a compound-if proposition. This causes essence’s being existent to be manifested by a compound-if proposition. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument. As we saw, Mīr Dāmād claims that the conclusion of his argument guarantees that existence is nothing in the world. This cannot be swallowed by Mullā Sadrā whose own view is that existence is real. The third account, however, can evade the argument, insofar as existence is not a property of essence. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence.

5.    Concluding remarks
If the arguments rendered above are sound, we reach to a criterion in order to interpret Mullā Sadrā’s view on the relationship between existence and essence: his thesis that existence is real is more fundamental than his explanation for the problem of essence’s being existence.
References
- Mīr Dāmād, Muhammad Bāqir. (1367H). al-Qabasāt, Edited by Mahī Muḥaqqiq, Tehan: TUP.
- Mīr Dāmād, Muhammad Bāqir. (1391H). al-’Ufuq al-Mubīn, Edited by Hāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī, Tehran: Mīrāth Maktūb.
- Mullā Sadrā, Muhammad, (1981). Al-Ḥikma al-Mut‘alīyah, Beyrouth: Dar Īḥya al-Turāth al-‘arabī.
- Mullā Sadrā, Muhammad, (1302H). Majmū‘a al-rasāil al-tes‘ah, Qum: Maktiba al-Muṣṭafā.
- Mullā Sadrā, Muhammad, (1363H). al-Mashā‘ir, Edited by Henry Corbin, Tehran: Tahoori Library.