Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Associate Professor, University of Isfahan
Abstract
The phenomenon is one of the ancient words in the history of western philosophy. It is used repeatedly in the works of Plato and Aristotle, and also is in Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and many other philosophers. In this essay, the main topic is comparing the sense of phenomenon in Kant and Heidegger. This is important because Kant's thoughts have caused fundamental changes in philosophy and as he claims he has created a Copernican Revolution in philosophy. It seems that his consideration of Phenomenon is, at least, one of the main elements of his Copernican Revolution, and, since he is one of the greatest modern philosophers, his understanding of the meaning of phenomenon has an essential relation to modern thought. The questions of this essay are: 1. what does phenomenon mean to Kant? And which consequences does it bring about? 2. What does phenomenon mean to Heidegger and how does he reject Kantian Phenomenon?
Highlights
Kant and Heıdegger on Phenomenon: a Crıtıcal Comparıson
Mohammad J. Safian
Associate Professor, University of Isfahan Email: safian@ltr.ui.ac.ir,
Abstract
The phenomenon is one of the ancient words in the history of western philosophy. It is used repeatedly in the works of Plato and Aristotle, and also is in Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and many other philosophers. In this essay, the main topic is comparing the sense of phenomenon in Kant and Heidegger. This is important because Kant's thoughts have caused fundamental changes in philosophy and as he claims he has created a Copernican Revolution in philosophy. It seems that his consideration of Phenomenon is, at least, one of the main elements of his Copernican Revolution, and, since he is one of the greatest modern philosophers, his understanding of the meaning of phenomenon has an essential relation to modern thought. The questions of this essay are: 1. what does phenomenon mean to Kant? And which consequences does it bring about? 2. What does phenomenon mean to Heidegger and how does he reject Kantian Phenomenon?
Keywords: Kant, Heidegger, Phenomenon, appearance, Thing in itself
Introductıon
In this essay, our presumption is that Kantian Phenomenon, in general, is an essential element in modern philosophy and Heidegger who grasped a different meaning for the phenomenon, tries to go beyond modern thought and reaches to a dimension of thought that could be entitled as poetical thinking.
Kant on Phenomenon
According to Kant, things manifest themselves for us only in accordance with our possibility to receive them, and we- as human beings- can receive things only through sensation. The sensation is our only possible intuition. Moreover, any sensation occurs in space and time which both are essential conditions in our sensation. Therefore, things appear to us not as they are in themselves but as our limitations let them appear. So when things appear to us, they are phenomena and we don’t know what really they are in themselves. The phenomenon for Kant can be known only by sensation. In the other words, Phenomena are valid only for human subjects and they are not similar to things in themselves, because we have no intuition but sensitive intuition and, we have no way knowing the things in themselves other than their manifestations for us. Therefore, the things in themselves are unknowable. But there are some questions: what is the relation between the thing-in-itself and its phenomenon (appearance)? Could we say that there isn’t any relation and compatibility between them? In addition, Why Kant make so radical separation between appearance and thing- in- itself? And, whether it is possible to ignore any compatibility between them and to consider this relationship as a complete incommensurable one?As it is pointed, things in themselves are unknowable and we apply the forms from our understanding to what is received through our senses and so this way we understand them as objects. So objects are products of our cognitive activities. Our world is the world of all possible objects which we form them, and we dominate on them. We impose our conditions (forms of our sensitive intuition and understanding) on them. And thereby we don’t let them manifest themselves as they are. This is the ontological domination of things. This kind of domination is the characteristic of modern thinkin.
Heidegger on Phenomenon
As a phenomenologist, Heidegger grasps many possibilities in phenomenology for thinking, and thus he reflects on the concept of the phenomenon and tries to clarify the meaning of it in relating to concepts such as ‘appearance’, ‘seeming’, and ‘mere appearance’. He starts by analyzing and interpreting the Greek word phainomenon and its associated vocabulary to find out the meaning of the word. In the seventh clause of Being and Time, titled "The phenomenological method of research," he explores in detail the concept of the phenomenon. The Greek expression phainomenon, from which the term "phenomenon" derives, comes from the verb phainesthai, meaning "to show itself." Thus phainomenon means what shows itself, the self-showing, and the manifest. Phaintsthai itself is a "middle voice" construction of phaino, to bring into daylight, to place in brightness. Phaino belongs to the root pha-, like phos, light or brightness, Thus the meaning of the expression "phenomenon" is established as what shows itself in itself, what is manifest. The phainomena… are thus the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light… the Greeks simply identified this with to onta (beings). (Heidegger, 1996:29). Heidegger argues that beings can show themselves from themselves in various ways, depending on the mode of access to them. The possibility even exists that they can show themselves as they are not in themselves. In this self-showing, a being ‘looks like this or not’. Heidegger calls such self-showing, seeming [Scheinen]. And so the expression phainomenon, also means semblance/[scheinbar]. Then phainomenon has both meanings: the semblance and the self-showing. Now one could ask how these two meaning are structurally connected. To reply to this question one could say that only because something, can show itself as something it is not, or can it ‘only look like something or not’. So Heidegger already uses the word phenomenon to cover the first meaning and the seeming/[schein] for the second one. Heidegger points out that the meaning of both words has nothing to do with the meaning of the appearance [Ersheinung] and especially mere appearance. The appearance is the presence of thing which shows itself. Therefore, the appearance in this sense is not synonymous with the concept of the phenomenon. According to Heidegger, mere appearance has no meaning. The appearance always is the appearance of something, and inevitably should be related to that thing. The Kantian phenomenon is a mere appearance, and this is unreasonable. The appearance is a two-sided concept, one side is what appears, and someone (or something) to whom (which) the thing is appeared to is located on another side. The appearance of a thing depends on the possibilities of the person whom the thing appears on him. To Kant, man's intuition in direct confrontation with the object is of our possibilities and confines it to sensory intuition. According to Kant, since we are finite, for knowing something it is necessary for us to receive it through our senses. For Kant, being is only related to the question of whether such a thing is given to us in such a way that the perception of it could, in any case, precede the concept. (Kant b, 1993: b 273)
Conclusıon
According to Kant, being is something that can be given to me according to general conditions of sensation, therefore, it is one of the prior concepts of understanding and could be applied only to what is given through experience. It means that beings are objects to us and are dependent on our conditions and possibilities and we are who form them. With such cognition, the way of dominate on things will be open, hence there is a relation of dominance on beings. On the other hand, Heidegger calls the phenomenon as “to show itself from itself.” In this approach, we have to let beings to show themselves from themselves, and we give them up. Our words and our knowledge derive from things, they aren’t dependent on us and we are not who shape them.
References
- Avecina, Hossain-ibn-e Abdullah (1983) Mantegh-e Shefa, Moghadamehy-e Ibrahim Madkuor,Manshuorat-e Maktab-e Ayatollah-e Marashi-e Najafi
- Bennet, Jonathan (1992) Kant’s Analytic, Cambridge University Press
- Dreyfus,Hubert and Paul Rabbiniow (1982) Michel Foucault Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics, Harvester Wheat sheaf, New York,
- Heidegger, Martin (1986) Sein und Zeit, Tubingen, man Niemer Verlag
- Heidegger, Martin (1979) Kant and the problem of metaphysics, tr. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press
- Heidegger, Martin (1982) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Tran. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press
- Kant, Immanuel (1993), critique of pure reason, tr. Norman kempt smith, London: the Macmillan press
- Kapleston, Fredrick (1977) Wolff to Kant, (Voi.6 of A History of Philosophy, Search Press , London
- Naghizadeh, Abdolhossahn(1985) Kant va Bidari Az Khab-e Dogmatism,Tehran,Nashr-e Agah
Keywords
)
Send comment about this article