Journal of Philosophical Investigations

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Institute for Social and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran

2 Faculty member, Institute for Culture, Art and Communications, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In Kant's moral theory, he describes two levels of highest good as sensible (realizable) and supersensible (reasonable). He mentions to these concepts in all his works, without shedding light on fundamental conflict and dispute inherited in the simultaneousness of these two. In accordance with the first level of this concept, have been known as a theological reading of the highest good concept, comparison, and accompaniment of two component of the highest good, that is happiness and virtue, only is achieved with the help of God. In addition to the postulate of God, this subject needs two other reasonable ideas of immortality and freedom. Besides, in accordance with the second level of this concept known as the secular and political reading of the highest good, the comparison is achieved with the help of human activity in this world in form of civil society. This content conflict, contrary to the view of some scholars, refers to two complementary forms in Kant’s thought and it corresponds with the general principles of his critical thinking. While explains Kant’s twofold positions on the highest good, this paper tries to demonstrate how these two forms need to another and otherwise, the complementary component cannot be explained.

Highlights

Kant and Twofold Forms of the Highest Good in the History

Reza Mahoozi1, Zohreh Saiedi2

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Institute for Social and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran. (Corresponding author) Email: Mahoozi.reza@gmail.co

2 Faculty member, Institute for Culture, Art and Communications, Tehran, Iran, Email: z.saedi.88@gmail.com.

Abstract

In Kant's moral theory, he describes two levels of highest good as sensible (realizable) and supersensible (reasonable). He mentions to these concepts in all his works, without shedding light on fundamental conflict and dispute inherited in the simultaneousness of these two. In accordance with the first level of this concept, have been known as a theological reading of the highest good concept, comparison, and accompaniment of two component of the highest good, that is happiness and virtue, only is achieved with the help of God. In addition to the postulate of God, this subject needs two other reasonable ideas of immortality and freedom. Besides, in accordance with the second level of this concept known as the secular and political reading of the highest good, the comparison is achieved with the help of human activity in this world in form of civil society. This content conflict, contrary to the view of some scholars, refers to two complementary forms in Kant’s thought and it corresponds with the general principles of his critical thinking. While explains Kant’s twofold positions on the highest good, this paper tries to demonstrate how these two forms need to another and otherwise, the complementary component cannot be explained.

Keywords: highest good, virtue, happiness, God, human, history.

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction 

It seems the theological reading of highest good is argued in the first and second critiques and also secular and political readings of this concept more explained in the third critique and in Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason. Some consider this categorization as the beginning of a shift in Kant’s view from theological to social (secular) (Reath, 1988: 600). In fact, in any of these works, the tow readings are not explained distinctively. Kant explains “sensible” or “reasonable” idea and the role of God as well as the human duty to achieve happiness and virtue together in the highest good concept.

The nature of highest good 

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant speaks about the highest good on the basis of the “good” concept and considers it as a real subject of the practical reason. In this book, two concepts of “good” and “the effect that comes from rational choice” (ibid, 57; 77), considered as the subject of practical reason. Kant demonstrates the unity of “supreme good” and “highest good” by linking them together in the form of “goodwill”. He, in fact, creates a meaningful relationship between the will of the moral agent and unconditional good and considers unconditional good as “goodwill”. 

The second concept in the highest good is happiness. Although the highest good is defined with the emphasis on supreme good or virtue and goodwill, the supreme good is not a complete good merely. Happiness as a conditional good, depending on the legal and moral behavior, is a complementary concept. It means virtue and happiness have their own position in creating the “completely good”.

According to the Kant, the distinction between happiness and virtue is related to the two folds of human or its citizenship of tow-world. Happiness is dealt with pleasures arise from physical and sensible desires of humanity and virtue is related to freedom, will, and morals. The conflict between these two occurs when the first (happiness) intends to satisfy its primitive needs and the second wants to control the same needs in benefit of developing freedom and rationality. The important point is that both own special Causality and tries to restrict the other for its interest.

Highest good in historical progress of reason

As mentioned before, the highest good is included two components: happiness and virtue. These components are always in conflict until the come to unity in the highest good and the conflicts come to its end. This derives the attention to the rational and theoretical aspects that Kant considers it in all his works as “rational ideal of highest good”. Kant believes that the highest good as a rational idea, is supersensible and it only can be imagined rationally. It means that it cannot be fulfilled completely in this world. Kant in Critique of Practical Reason explains the idea of the highest good. 

Based on what comes before, in the philosophy of Kant, the rational idea of the highest end as a supersensible aspect, is a formal condition of endless alignment for happiness and virtue in this world; Alignment that present itself in the shape of civil institutions in republican government and gradual progress of reason for human being. 

Conclusion

The relation between the rational idea of the highest good and relative fulfillment of this concept in this world is a matter that Kant’s readers should pursue in the whole works of this philosophy. In fact, through reading the recent works of Kant, including Progress of Reason, Education, and Sustainable Development, the relation of these two levels can be explained. In other words, the highest good as the end of the conflict between happiness and virtue is the final end that calls the conflict toward itself and explains this in accord with the freedom of human being. The very human who sees the nature as a teleological entity, he himself goes towards the final end of moral and nature by his own authority, without any limitation in will and freedom of reason by external reason (Devin destiny) or any other metaphysical reason. This is what the Philosophy of Hegel deal with in explaining the type and companionship of nature end with rational movement and evolution of humanity.

According to Kant, moving opposite affairs towards unity point and without any conflict is explained based on the distinction among noumenon and phenomenon. The idea of unity is merely a noumenon that cannot be fulfilled in this irrational world. Moreover, either this idea or the complete human authority, both are among rational entities without any conflict. In contrast, in one hand, Hegel persuades the fulfillment of unity final point and ending of all conflicts in this world by denying the distinction between Ration and Reality and on the other hand, relates the teleological moving of conflicts to objective fact and not to the transcendental reading of human mind. Therefore, Hegel, in his philosophy, might explain the relationship between human reason and nature teleology without damaging human freedom. Most of the interpreters of Hegel works have many troubles with this matter.

References

-        Allison, H. E. (2001) Kant's Theory of Taste, Cambridge University Press, First Published.

-        Beck, L. (1960) A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, University of Chicago Press

-        Gonzalez, A. M. (2010) Kant and a culture of freedom, Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 96(3), 291-308.

-        Kant, I. (2001) Sustainable Peace (M. Sabouri, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Beh Bavaran.

-        Kant, I. (2006) Critique of practical reason (E. Rahmati, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Nour al-Saqalayn.

-        Kant, I. (2013a) Critique of judgment (A. Rashidian, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Ney.

-        Kant, I. (2013b). Education (Gh. Shokuhi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Tehran University Press.

-        Kant, I. (2014). Moral philosophy (M. Sanei darrebidi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Naqš-o-Negar.

-         Kant, I. (2015a). Critique of pure reason (B. Nazari, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Qoqnous.

-        Kant, I. (2015b). Religion within the bounds of mere reason (M. Sanei Darrebidi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Naqš-o-Negar.

-        Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason. Paul Guyer and AlIen W Wood, Cambridge University Press.

-        Kant, I. (2000) Critique of the Power of Judgment (CJ), P. Guyer ed.; E. Matthews and P. Guyer, trans.Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

-        Kant, I. (2002) Critique of Practical Reason, Werner S. Pluhar. Hackett Publishing Company, United States of America.

-        Kraft, M. (1996) "Kant's Theory of teleology", Immanuel Kant Critical Assessment. vol. 4.

-        Reath, Andrews (1988), "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant", Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 26, Number 4, pp. 593-619 (Article).

-        Sanei Darrebidi, M., (2015a). Progress of reason. Tehran, Iran: Naqš-o-Negar.

Keywords

-      Allison, H. E. (2001) Kant's Theory of Taste, Cambridge University Press, First Published.
-      Beck, L. (1960) A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, University of Chicago Press
-      Gonzalez, A. M. (2010) Kant and a culture of freedom, Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 96(3), 291-308.
-      Kant, I. (2001) Sustainable Peace (M. Sabouri, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Beh Bavaran.
-      Kant, I. (2006) Critique of practical reason (E. Rahmati, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Nour al-Saqalayn.
-      Kant, I. (2013a) Critique of judgment (A. Rashidian, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Ney.
-      Kant, I. (2013b). Education (Gh. Shokuhi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Tehran University Press.
-      Kant, I. (2014). Moral philosophy (M. Sanei darrebidi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Naqš-o-Negar.
-       Kant, I. (2015a). Critique of pure reason (B. Nazari, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Qoqnous.
-      Kant, I. (2015b). Religion within the bounds of mere reason (M. Sanei Darrebidi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Naqš-o-Negar.
-      Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason. Paul Guyer and AlIen W Wood, Cambridge University Press.
-      Kant, I. (2000) Critique of the Power of Judgment (CJ), P. Guyer ed.; E. Matthews and P. Guyer, trans.Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
-      Kant, I. (2002) Critique of Practical Reason, Werner S. Pluhar. Hackett Publishing Company, United States of America.
-      Kraft, M. (1996) "Kant's Theory of teleology", Immanuel Kant Critical Assessment. vol. 4.
-      Reath, Andrews (1988), "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant", Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 26, Number 4, pp. 593-619 (Article).
-      Sanei Darrebidi, M., (2015a). Progress of reason. Tehran, Iran: Naqš-o-Negar.
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