Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Assistance Professor, University of Shahid Beheshti
2 Ph.D. Candidate of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, University of Shahid Beheshti,
Abstract
Theory of judgment is a significant problem in contemporary philosophy. Epistemology, logic, semantics and cognitive psychology are important philosophical areas which deal with different faces of the theory of judgment. One of the greatest problems in contemporary Kant Studies concerns Kant’s theory of judgment. Until 1970, an accepted reading of Kant’s theory of judgment was widespread among Kant’s English-speaking interpreters. Since 1970, some scholars began to understand and interpret Kant’s theory of judgment in a different way. This shift has led to huge and wide interpretive-philosophical discussions among Kant’s scholars. According to some scholars, traces of two different theories of judgment are found in Kant’s works: explicit theory of judgment and implicit theory of judgment. In this paper, considering interpretive viewpoints of some of Kant scholars, we contrast these two theories of predication and explicate their differences. Our conclusion is that Kant’s implicit or hidden theory of judgment is more consistent with Kant’s works and philosophical views. Moreover, one of the main implications of implicit theory of judgment is that we must interpret Chapter of Schematism and logico-semantic structure of a priori synthetic judgments in a different way.
Highlights
Kant's Theory of Judgment, Explicit Predication or Implicit one?
Ahmad Aliakbar Mesgari1, Arash Jamshidpour2
1 Assistance Professor, University of Shahid Beheshti (corresponding author), Email: a-aliakbar@sbu.ac.ir
2 Ph.D. Student of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, University of Shahid Beheshti, Email: arash_philomis@yahoo.com
Abstract
Theory of judgment is a significant problem in contemporary philosophy. Epistemology, logic, semantics and cognitive psychology are important philosophical areas which deal with different faces of the theory of judgment. One of the greatest problems in contemporary Kant Studies concerns Kant’s theory of judgment. Until 1970, an accepted reading of Kant’s theory of judgment was widespread among Kant’s English-speaking interpreters. Since 1970, some scholars began to understand and interpret Kant’s theory of judgment in a different way. This shift has led to huge and wide interpretive-philosophical discussions among Kant’s scholars. According to some scholars, traces of two different theories of judgment are found in Kant’s works: explicit theory of judgment and implicit theory of judgment. In this paper, considering interpretive viewpoints of some of Kant scholars, we contrast these two theories of predication and explicate their differences. Our conclusion is that Kant’s implicit or hidden theory of judgment is more consistent with Kant’s works and philosophical views. Moreover, one of the main implications of implicit theory of judgment is that we must interpret Chapter of Schematism and logico-semantic structure of a priori synthetic judgments in a different way.
Keywords: theory of judgment, concept, intuition, analytic, synthetic, schematism, logical, semantic.
Introduction and Objective
Kant’s theory of Judgment is the crossroad of all important problems put forward in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. It can be claimed that most of Kant’s main theses in epistemology, metametaphysics, and philosophy of logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics have a close connection with Kant’s theory of judgment. The analytic-synthetic distinction is one of the most significant distinctions in Kant’s theory of judgment. In the interpretive literature, there are two conflicting views of the structure and components of analytic and synthetic judgments. These two views disagree on the logico-semantic content of analytic and synthetic judgments. First and older view argues that the constituents of all judgments are concepts, while second and more recent view argues that components of analytic judgments are only concepts but synthetic judgments consist of concepts and intuitions. Some of the Adherents of the second view call these two conceptions of propositional structure respectively “explicit or manifest” and “implicit or hidden” theory of judgment and prediction. Our aim is to contrast these two theories of judgment or predication and clarify their differences.
Method
Our method in this paper is the interpretive method. For the purpose of interpreting Kant’s views according to our scheme and objective, three sources have been consulted. Firstly, we referred to some of prominent Kant scholars’ interpretations of Critical Philosophy. Secondly, we tried to reconstruct Kant’s views in consideration of modern, analytic developments in contemporary philosophy, especially with regard to achievements in the philosophy of language. Thirdly, we took into account some of Kant’s neglected works, such as his Lectures on Logic, his Correspondence, and his Reflexionen. These three sorts of interpretive sources comprise our hermeneutic material.
Findings and Arguments
Our finding in this paper is that Kant’s “implicit or hidden” theory of judgment and prediction has two interpretive-philosophical merits. Firstly, the implicit or hidden theory is more consistent with Kant’s other sayings and views. Secondly, the implicit theory of judgment has more philosophical justification and strength. These findings are based on this master argument that Kant’s manifest theory of judgment generates five interpretive problems which are not solvable according to Kant’ explicit claims in Critique and Prolegomena. But, when we pay attention to Kant’s arguments and practices in Critique and his other works, problems begin to disappear. Consequently, we should look for Kant’s proper theory in his arguments and less quoted works.
Conclusions and Suggestions
The main conclusion of our findings is that if Kant’s preferred theory of predication is his implicit or hidden theory of judgment, then we should interpret the chapter on Schematism and the logico-semantic structure of synthetic a priori judgments differently. For doing this, we should revisit Kant’s distinction between concepts and intuitions. Our view is that some of Kant’s central but ambiguous views are clarified only when we take notice of his other works, especially Reflexionen, Lectures on Logic, Lectures on Metaphysics, and Correspondence. Besides, findings of this paper show that considering Kant’s theoretical philosophy in the context of his rationalist predecessors’ philosophies (Leibniz and Wolf) is important and illuminating in reconstructing Kant’s definitions and distinctions.
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