Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Ph.D. in philosophy, Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia
Abstract
The question concerning names and things discussed in Cratylus, repeats the old and fundamental philosophical subject of "phusis" and "nomos"; an essential issue which may be considered as the ground for many theories in Greek philosophy. The question In Cratylus is how relates a name (ονομα) to its object or thing (πραγμα) to which the name refers. Are names by nature, i.e. is there any necessary relation between a name and its object (φυσει), or as long as there is a convention, an object could be called by any name (θεσει). According to Socrates the true nature of anything is tobe found in its idea and not in its perishable material form. Thus the naturally correct name is that which imitates the idea and reveals it.
Highlights
The Relation between Names and Things in Crtylus and its Relation to the Problem of Nomos and Phusis
AmirHossein Saket 1Mohammad Ilkhani2
1 Ph.D. in philosophy, Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia (corresponding author), E-mail: saketof@yahoo.com
2 Professor of philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran,
E-mail: m-ilkhani@cc.sbu.ac.ir
Abstract
The question concerning names and things discussed in Cratylus, repeats the old and fundamental philosophical subject of "phusis" and "nomos"; an essential issue which may be considered as the ground for many theories in Greek philosophy. The question In Cratylus is how relates a name (ονομα) to its object or thing (πραγμα) to which the name refers. Are names by nature, i.e. is there any necessary relation between a name and its object (φυσει), or as long as there is a convention, an object could be called by any name (θεσει). According to Socrates the true nature of anything is tobe found in its idea and not in its perishable material form. Thus the naturally correct name is that which imitates the idea and reveals it.
Keywords: Philosophy of Language, Plato, Cratylus, Phusis, Nomos
The most Greek thinkers before 500 BC, considered phusis and nomos in correspondence with each other and observed no opposition between them. In consequence of certain social and political changes, however, many thinkers of the next generations denied such correspondence and held them in extreme contrast. In Greek, philosophy names are regarded as a kind of nomos, and thus the questions mentioned above hold true in the case of names. Here the question deals with the relation between names and things and is asked whether names arise from the nature of things or they are just human conventions. Those who considered nomos as universal and inevitable, believed in their correspondence, while those who denied such a correspondence, considered names as conventional and completely relative. The most presocratic philosophers belonged to the first group. Plato assigns this view to Homer and refers to him in the case of naturally correct names. Heraclitus is of the same opinion and has the same view regarding names and things. Cratylus who in this dialogue adheres to such a view is one of Heraclitus' followers.
The opposition between phusis and nomos reaches to the matter of language and from late 5th century upward hesitation about natural names rises increasingly. Sophists were among those who denied any correspondence between phusis and nomos. As long as there is a convention, an object could be designated by any name. Plato in Cratylus holds this view as a necessary consequence to Protagoras' thoughts since relativity of names follows necessarily from the relativity of knowledge. Protagoras and those sophists denying the nature of things, consequently reject the preference of some names to others, because for them things have no other nature behind what they appear, to which correspond names.
Plato has no doubt as to the correspondence between phusis and nomos and therefore rejects nomos' relativity. He regards, as did many thinkers before him, human laws and values correspondent with the nature of things, though nature means for him the ideas imitated by all things and from which all things originate. So in Plato's philosophy, the correspondence of phusis and nomos changes to a correspondence between nomos and ideas, i.e. true law and value have to be in accordance with ideas. Religion, ethics, law and anything called nomos is right only if in accordance with ideas. In opposition to perishable things of our world, the ideas are eternal and unchangeable and their eternity and immobility assure the validity of human universal values.
Language like all other instances of nomos depends on the reasonability and necessity originated from the ideas. Plato often calls name-giver a lawgiver which discloses their mutual correlation in his mind. Names are true as much as they correctly represent the ideas. The name given too like the lawgiver is able to make true names because of his true knowledge of the ideas. Name is a kind of picture which consists of sounds and syllables describing its object. So like any other picture, it should be akin to what it describes, as much as possible. Nevertheless, Plato finds the true nature of things not in their corporeal and perishable form, but in their eternal and permanent form, i.e. in their idea. Therefore names imitate the idea and are to be made in accordance with them. Cratylus' main topic, indeed, is another account of the old question concerning phusis and nomos. Hermogenes denying any correspondence between them represents sophists and those who reject such a correspondence. Cratylus, on the other hand, represents the view of the opponents. Plato himself takes a middle position in this argument. He accepts Cratylus' view providing that instead of phusis and names, it would mean a correspondence between things and ideas. He also agrees with Hermogenes because many names like many laws and traditions are different in different regions. But as long as the idea of something reflects correctly in its name, the variety of sounds and syllables does not matter. Hence the form of a name is almost conventional and depends on agreement, though the content has to reflect the idea and has nothing to do with agreement.
In this article will be argued that Plato’s answer to the question concerning the relationship between names and things is the same as to the question concerning nomos and phusis. How completely a name corresponds with its idea, as is the case in the other applications of nomos, is the only criterion of its validity. Thus having considered ideas, rather than phusis, as the foundation of all things, including names as well as other human affairs, Plato found a solution for both of the questions.
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