1. Introduction

The current paper is aimed to address a problem with the role of the philosopher in Hegel's Phenomenology. The controversial point here is that Hegel appears to indicate the active role of phenomenological philosopher or observer, who is behind the back of consciousness, by means of which the succession of experiences consciousness undergoes is raised into the standpoint of science or of beginning the philosophy. On the other hand, since for Hegel, the process of the expansion of consciousness is a kind of self-developing that arises from the essence of consciousness itself, it appears all that is left for the philosopher to do is just to look at the movement of consciousness.

2. Phenomenology and the role of the philosopher: necessity, and skepticism

The role of philosopher in Phenomenology is connected to the significant contribution made by philosophical observer behind the back of consciousness, in order to observe the necessity that lies in the process of the development of consciousness, and also change the empty skepticism as a merely negative procedure into the thoroughgoing and determinate skepticism directed against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness and ends up with content.

Examining the role of the philosopher with regard to necessity and skepticism, we are faced with this problem that whether the existence of the observer out of the consciousness is consistent with the process of self-developing of consciousness which is an immanent process.

3. Negative or positive dialectic?

The dialectic of Phenomenology could be construed in two different ways: negative, and positive. In the first state, in order to be capable of resolving the problem of the role of a philosophical observer, it can be said that the role of the philosopher in the movement of consciousness is a passive one as a mere observer, without any especial position out of the consciousness. In the second state, the role of the philosopher is an active one behind the back of consciousness in the transformation of the forms of consciousness to reach self-consciousness. Phenomenology to Hegel is not a systematic science or philosophy, so it doesn’t involve a mere positive dialectic; however, since Phenomenology is a road to science or the beginning of systematic philosophy, it cannot be empty of positive dialectic. That’s why the main problem mentioned as a conflict about the role of the philosopher in Phenomenology would be expected.

4. Phenomenology is the ladder to the standpoint of philosophy 

To reach a better understanding of the controversial problem resulted from Hegel's both negative and positive positions, we can look at Wittgenstein's view about the philosophy and compare it with Hegel's. Wittgenstein stands on the left extreme edge of deflationary philosophy, and Hegel, contrasting to Wittgenstein, the right extreme edge of inflationary philosophy. One wills to end philosophical endeavor by acquiring true knowledge by means of systematic philosophy, the other one by stopping such philosophy and its claim to knowledge. Hegel's Phenomenology, in essence, creates a situation in which the criterion of cognition returns into the consciousness itself, quite the same way as Wittgenstein returns criterion of sense into the language. When the criterion is inside of consciousness or language as a context, all things are ready for contextualism; as a result, the main role of the philosopher is nothing but observe the process of that context as a whole, and their standpoint cannot be out of that whole like behind the back of consciousness. However, Hegel as an inflationary philosopher wants this observation to have a positive fruit, and his Phenomenology, therefore, be a permanent ladder led to a systematic philosophy, hence, even perhaps opposite to the principles of his own contextualism, Phenomenology to Hegel cannot be free of privilege standpoint of philosopher and their active role, while this very standpoint of philosopher, as if they are observing language from outside, is something denied by Wittgenstein as a semantic illusion, and therefore, Wittgenstein's works as phenomenological ones provide an impermanent ladder which has to be pulled out once it was used to climb.   

5. Conclusion

The dialectic of Phenomenology is prone to be construed in two different ways, based on which the role of the philosopher could be different: negative and positive. In the first one, there is no especial role but observation for the philosopher; therefore, Hegel's Phenomenology like Wittgenstein's works provides a situation to contextualism in which there is no need to import external criteria. That's why, both of two philosophers are looking at consciousness (in Hegel) or language (in Wittgenstein) as a whole, outside of which there is no cognitive (in Hegel) or meaningful (Wittgenstein) object. However, Hegel is an inflationary philosopher, unlike Wittgenstein; as a result, in his Phenomenology in the second state, an active role with the especial situation is given to philosophers to lead consciousness to the beginning of systematic philosophy.

References

-      Findlay, J. N. (1977) analysis of the text in Phenomenology of Spirit, G. W. F. Hegel, trans. A. V. Miller with analysis of the text and foreword: J. N. Findlay, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press

-      Houlgate, Stephen (2013) Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, London, New Dehli, New York, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic

-      Solomon, Robert C. (1983) In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press

-      Verene, Donald Phillip (2007) Hegel's absolute: an introduction to reading The phenomenology of spirit, New York: State University of New York Press

-      Yovel, Yirmiyahu (2005) Commentary on Hegel's preface to phenomenology of spirit, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, trans. & running commentary: Yirmiyahu Yovel, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.