Document Type : Research Paper

Author

• ahmad hamdollahi

assistant professor of Azarbaijan Shahid Madani University

Abstract

In the third paralogism, Kant seeking to show that the recognition of identity and the personality of the soul is not possible, and the argument which claims to be the proof of identity and the personality of the soul is an absurd argument. But the words and explanations that he has presented in this regard are far more complex and vague. At this paper we have tried, firstly, by thorough reflection on this descriptions and focus on other Kant's fundamental opinions and views, get a fairly detailed picture of his view of this so-called fallacy; secondly, to critique and evaluate his view.
A detailed analysis of Kant's explanations shows that, on the one hand, he emphasizes on the identity of the soul as an analytic and a priori truth, but on the other hand, at the same time, his main goal and all his efforts is to show that An analytical and a priori identity of the soul is not an objective identity; therefore, citing it, one cannot claim to recognize the objective identity and personality of the soul. The result of evaluating Kant's main claims on the third Paralogism is that, due to the conflicts and inconsistencies between these claims with some of the basic perspectives and principles of his philosophy, he cannot consistently and logically deny the recognition of objective identity and personality of the soul.

Highlights

A Critical Analysis of the Third Paralogism of Kant's Paralogisms of Pure Reason

 

Ahmad Hamdollahi

Assistant Professor, Shahid Madani University of Azarbaijan, E-mail: ac.hamdollahi@azaruniv.ac.ir

 

Abstract

In the third paralogism, Kant seeking to show that the recognition of identity and the personality of the soul is not possible, and the argument which claims to be the proof of identity and the personality of the soul is an absurd argument. But the words and explanations that he has presented in this regard are far more complex and vague. At this paper we have tried, firstly, by thorough reflection on this descriptions and focus on other Kant's fundamental opinions and views, get a fairly detailed picture of his view of this so-called fallacy; secondly, to critique and evaluate his view.

A detailed analysis of Kant's explanations shows that, on the one hand, he emphasizes on the identity of the soul as an analytic and a priori truth, but on the other hand, at the same time, his main goal and all his efforts is to show that An analytical and a priori identity of the soul is not an objective identity; therefore, citing it, one cannot claim to recognize the objective identity and personality of the soul. The result of evaluating Kant's main claims on the third Paralogism is that, due to the conflicts and inconsistencies between these claims with some of the basic perspectives and principles of his philosophy, he cannot consistently and logically deny the recognition of objective identity and personality of the soul.

Keywords: Kant, Paralogisms of pure reason, third paralogism, soul (ego), identity, personality, logical inconsistency.

Introduction

The issue of self, according to Kant, is one of the three main problems of metaphysics. He does not consider metaphysics as knowledge, therefore, in his opinion, it would be impossible to obtain any theoretical knowledge of the soul. According to Kant, the arguments that claim to provide knowledge about the self are fallacious and therefore cannot provide self-knowledge. He posited this view and its explanations in the critique of pure reason, entitled "Paralogisms of pure reason". He believes that in the context of rational psychology, there are four basic propositions about the soul, which are:

1)”The soul is substance

2) As regards its quality it is simple.

3) As regards the different Times in which it exists, it is numerically identical, that is, unity (not plurality).

4) It is in relation to possible objects in space”. (Kant, 1929: B 402)

 The third Paralogism of these is related to the identity and personality of the soul. Kant, in accordance with the general principle that he has taken, in this Paralogism, wants to show that the argument which claims to be the recognition of the identity and the personality of the soul is a fallacy. But the truth is that the explanations that he has presented about this argument and its faults are ambiguous and complex. In the foregoing article, our goal is to firstly provide an even clear picture of Kant's views and explanations about this argument; secondly, and in the meanwhile, considering these explanations and taking into account other Kant's main views, we will evaluate Kant's position on this argument.

Material and method

The main theme of this paper is the same text of Kant's descriptions about the third Paralogism in the critique of pure reason. Of course, Kant's other main views on this book, as well as the views of his commentators, if it is necessary, are also referenced. The main method of our work, in the first step, had been the accurate reading of Kant's words and descriptions, and the consideration of his various phrases, and so the attempt to extract and infer his main views on this Paralogism. In the second step, we have tried to evaluate and criticize Kant's main claims about this Paralogism, based on logical principles and criteria.

The findings and results

1) A detailed analysis of Kant's whole descriptions of the third Paralogism reveals two important points:

a) He regards and recognizes the identity of "I" as a necessary and a priori valid truth.

 b) But at the same time; the main purpose and all his efforts are to show that this identity is not an objective one, and therefore is beyond the scope of our "knowledge".

2) Considering the distinction Kant finds between analytic identity of "ego" and objective identity of "I", we must say that, in his opinion, the fallacy of the argument about the identity and personality of the soul is the confusion between these two meanings; namely, the analytic and a priori valid identity of the soul regarded as an objective identity and thereby, the objective personality of the soul is deduced from it. 

3) Despite all Kant's efforts, he seems to have failed to achieve his main purpose on this Paralogism, and, given the conflicts and inconsistencies that exist between some of his explanations on this Paralogism with some of his fundamental views, he has not been able to refuse and deny Consistently and logically, the recognition of the objective identity of the soul.

References

-         Ameriks, Karl, (2000) Kant's theory of mind, second edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

-         Guyer, Paul, (2006) Kant, first published, Rutledge.

-         Hartnack, Justus, (1378) Kant's theory of knowledge, translated by Gholamali Haddad Adel, second edition, Tehran, Fekr-rooz.

-         Kant, Immanuel, (1362) Critique of pure reason, translated by Mir Shams-Aldin Adib Soltaany, first published, Tehran, Amirkabir.

-         Kant, Immanuel, (1929) Critique of pure reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, first published, Palgrave Macmillan.

-         Kemp Smith, Norman, (1918) A commentary to Kant's critique of pure reason, first published, Macmillan co.

Keywords

• Kant
• Paralogisms of pure reason
• third paralogism
• soul (ego)
• identity
• personality
• logical inconsistency