The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی


1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز

2 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی


هگل در نخستین بخش از کتاب پدیدارشناسی روح، ادعاهای مهمی از یقین حسی را مورد نقد قرار داده است که دارای اهمیت استراتژیک در کل فرایند کتاب خویش است. یقین حسی مدعی است که شناختی تکین و جزئی از ابژه‌ بلاواسطه خود دارد؛ و از ادعای خود در سه‌گام و از طریق سه پناهگاهِ ابژه محض، سوژه محض و شهود محض دفاع می‌کند. با توجه به متن پدیدارشناسی روح، سعی به توضیح و تفسیر این مبحث شده است که چگونه هگل با استفاده از این چند اصطلاح کلیدی فلسفه‌ خویش (که برای نخستین بار در بطن بخش یقین حسی مطرح‌شده و تا پایان کتاب نقش محوری ایفا می‌کنند)، یعنی وساطت، تلاقی سوژه و ابژه، صورت معقول کلیت در امر جزئی و همچنین قدرت نفی، می‌تواند به درون ادعاهای یقین حسی نفوذ کند و آن‌ها را به تناقض درونی دچار کند و نشان دهد که یقین حسی در طی مراحل خویش بااینکه به دنبال اثبات امر تکین بوده، با این وجود در تمام تلاش‌های خود، به‌واقع، به اثبات امر کلی نزدیک می‌شده است.

تازه های تحقیق


Hegel has to break through the immediate (and his claims) before he can conquer the world. And pave the way for his understanding of thought, subject matter, and basic terms that are consistent with thinking and movement of the subject matter. And this is much deeper than to say that this chapter is purely about the criticism of empiricists and positivists. So in the first step, Hegel fights with his most powerful enemy in the field of theory. And in this fight, Hegel uses all his power to bring it to its knees. We are going to interpret how Hegel with the critique of cense certainty can get permission to use his own theoretical approach.

Three original moments of sense-certainty generally

In the first place, sense-certainty sought to prove its singularity and individuality with the pure object in front of it but after it became clear that "this", "here" and "now" are general concepts, He went to his second refuge, the pure subject, to extract singularity from this "I". So sense-certainty of "this", "here" and "now" was transferred to what "I" means by these things. In the second step, the sense-certainty became capture of the general "I" and entered the third step to remain in its claim in which, apart from "I" and every other object, he devoted himself to the pure intuition of a particular case. Because it was with the plurality of objects in the first step and with the plurality of "I" in the second step, its claim failed. So in the third step, he tries to ignore the two, but in this step, he also distances from the immediateness that he claimed. And it should only be limited to one here or one singular "I". in this case, pure intuition loses the ability to express the place and time of own experience which is a complete breach of the claims of sense-certainty.

But the significance of the debate was how Hegel confronted claims of sense-certainty. And how he spoke of the basic principles of his thinking such as mediation, the intersection of subject and object, the presence of conception of universality in a partial circumstance, as well as the power of the negative for the first time in sense-certainty with regard to the necessity of discussion and how with these terms invade the havens of sense-certainty. This usage also has a complex dialectical structure because, on the one hand, Hegel uses them to critique the immediacy and simple sense-certainty and on the other hand, with the collapse of the claims, he also gains justification for using them. In the first step, the subject of "I (or ego)" creates the first gap and the sense-certainty quickly disassociates itself from the view that it obtains all truth from the object. But it cannot escape from the conception of universality in a partial circumstance as well as the negative and invalidates both the first and second steps with the same principles. And Hegel enters the first strike to the immediate claim of sense-certainty and enters it into a general complex dialectic of the inside of partiality and being and not being. After saying this, Hegel says that by the general, we are expressing what is sense-content because "I", "here", "now" and "this" are all general things and negate their partial things in this general thing. It is also the negation that invalidates the third step or third solution of sense-certainty because it indicates, Sense-certainty cannot attain to its will through the sheer intuition and denial of any other self and object. And by doing so, Hegel dictates the concept of mediation even in the most particular things.


Thus, contrary to the claim of sensory-certainty, it is unable to experience the particular, for it is now clear that 'this', 'now', 'here' all refer to the general, and give rise to a multitude of particulars that negate themselves within these general things. It is the negation that seems to have played a central role from the beginning because there was a negation element within all of the plural 'these', 'here' and 'now'. Each time they negated the object they were referring to, so the object, or truth, as manifested in the experience of sense-certainty, is not a being or mere immediate existence, as sensory certainty thought about the object, but a complex combination of being, not being and negation.


-      Hegel, G. (2010) The science of logic. (M. Baur, Ed., & G. d. Giovanni, Trans.) New York: Cambridge University Press.

-      Hegel, G. W. (2018) The Phenomenology of Spirit. (M. Baur, Ed., & T. Pinkard, Trans.) New York: Cambridge University Press.

-      Siep, L. (2014) Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit. (D. Smyth, Trans.) New York: Cambridge University Press.

-      Stern, R. (1990) Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object. New York: Routledge.

-      Stern, R. (2002) Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Routledge.

-      Yovel, Y. (2005) Hegel's preface to the phenomenology of spirit. Princeton: Princeton University Press


عنوان مقاله [English]

Uncovering the Hidden Universality in the Singularity: Analysis of the Sense-Certainty Part of the Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohsen Bagherzadeh Meshkibaf 1
  • mohsen Habibi 2

1 PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz

2 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Allameh Tabataba'i

چکیده [English]

In the first part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel criticized major claims of sense-certainty that have strategic importance across the book’s process. The sense-certainty claims that it has partial and singular cognition of its immediate object; and supports his claims in three steps and through the three havens as the absolute object, the absolute subject and the absolute Intuition. Considering the text of Phenomenology of Spirit, we attempted explanation and interpretation of how Hegel could pervade into the claims of sense-certainty using these key terms of his philosophy, i.e. mediation, subject and object contact, Conception of universality in a partial circumstance, as well as the power of negation (which are first suggested in the sense-certainty part and play essential role throughout the book) and throw them into an internal Contradiction and indicate that through its steps, the sense-certainty actually comes close to corroborate the universal circumstance by all its efforts though it looks for corroboration of the singular circumstance.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Hegel
  • sense-certainty
  • universal
  • Particular
  • mediation
  • power of negation
  • the conception of universality in a partial circumstance