Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Professor of Allameh Tabataba’i University
2 Ph.D. Student of Allameh Tabataba’i University
Abstract
One of the most important concepts in meta-ethics which are used in moral contexts and has a significant role in moral judgments is the concept of goodness, which is a value concept. William David Ross was a philosopher who scrutinized this concept and said it is not analyzable to other moral concepts such as ought, right, duty and responsibility. Although other philosophers preceded him including Kant and Moore theorized about goodness and had different accounts about this concept, their views had a deep influence on Ross. This paper tries to examine his meta-ethical view in the light of Kant and Moore’s thoughts and their ethical theories. The method of this research is comparative and descriptive and has used books and online sources in order to see in what cases he was influenced by them and to what extent we can call his view new. Finally, this research concludes that though Ross was influenced by them, he could overcome their difficulties and bring up his new theory about this subject. And although he criticized their thoughts, he tried to unite some elements of their views and added other elements to them in order to express his final theory about the goodness of character.
Highlights
The Originality of Ross’s Meta-Ethical View on Good and its Justification in Moral act in Light of the philosophy of Kant and Moore
Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari1, Bita Nakhaei2
1 Professor of Allameh Tabataba’i University, E-mail: hkashtari@yahoo.com
2 Ph.D. Student of Allameh Tabataba’i University, E-mail: b.nakhaei@atu.ac.ir
Abstract
One of the most important concepts in meta-ethics which are used in moral contexts and has a significant role in moral judgments is the concept of goodness, which is a value concept. William David Ross was a philosopher who scrutinized this concept and said it is not analyzable to other moral concepts such as ought, right, duty and responsibility. Although other philosophers preceded him including Kant and Moore theorized about goodness and had different accounts about this concept, their views had a deep influence on Ross. This paper tries to examine his meta-ethical view in the light of Kant and Moore’s thoughts and their ethical theories. The method of this research is comparative and descriptive and has used books and online sources in order to see in what cases he was influenced by them and to what extent we can call his view new. Finally, this research concludes that though Ross was influenced by them, he could overcome their difficulties and bring up his new theory about this subject. And although he criticized their thoughts, he tried to unite some elements of their views and added other elements to them in order to express his final theory about the goodness of character.
Keywords: good, moral action, intuitionism, Ross, virtue.
Introduction
The first question which comes to one’s mind while discussing ethics is which acts/actions are right, wrong and which are good and bad. In other words, are there any rules or principles to help one decide about the goodness or rightness of his actions? However, it is essential to scrutinize moral concepts in order to justify actions. Moral philosophy in the sphere of meta-ethics is about to study moral meaning and nature such as right, wrong, duty, and obligation. William David Ross who was a moral intuitionist theorized one of the concepts of value- goodness- which has been used in many moral contexts and from a long time ago has been brought up by philosophers. Although he is considered as a normative philosopher and believed in principles of prima facie duties, has done a different analysis about this. The importance of this analysis is whether goodness can be differentiated from normative concepts. What is meant by moral goodness and what criteria are there to distinguish it from other forms of goodness?
It is important to mention Immanuel Kant and George Edward Moore who were interested in the notion of goodness before Ross and it was a central concept in their philosophy. However, they both had different accounts of goodness. Therefore, this research studies the concept of goodness in Ross’s view and compares it with his precedents’ positions. In this way, this issue is addressing the analysis of the meaning of goodness, analysis of nature of goodness, different kinds of goodness and analysis of moral goodness.
1- Meaning of goodness in Ross’s view
A study of the meaning of good and of the nature of goodness begins by recognizing that there are various senses related to this word. Ross believes that a distinction should be drawn between (1) the adjunctive or attributive use of the word and (2) the predicative use of it. The first refers to when we speak of a good runner or of a good poem. In this case, good seems to be that of success or efficiency. Ross does not care for this usage and believes it is not important for ethics because the meaning is relative. The notion in question is one which the maker of it has successfully achieved his goals. The second refers to when it is said that knowledge is good or that pleasure is good. Ross points out that this is an absolute term. Within this usage, three meanings have to be distinguished (Ross, 2007: 65-67). (1) good may mean useful. A hedonist calls virtue good because it is conducive to pleasure. Ross thinks it implies a causal relationship between the thing assumed good and its certain effect. Therefore, this definition cannot be accepted because it involves a naturalistic view. Thus this usage points directly to instrumentally good. However, Ross prefers to use good as an intrinsically or ultimately good which is not good only when it is desired and only when nonexistent. Intrinsically good is good apart from any of the results it produces (Sidgwick, 1962:218).
2- Nature of intrinsic good
Ross was much influenced by Moore’s view about the nature of intrinsic good and in most cases accepted his position. However, he tried to criticize some points in Moore’s view and express his new idea. At least four aspects can be mentioned in which Ross was influenced:
(a) moral realism is a view that Moore attempted to deny subjectivism about moral concepts. If two people have different opinions about rightness and goodness of an action, they do not contradict each other, but just express their feelings. According to Ross, what makes our moral belief that x is good true, is the property or objective characteristic that x has. Therefore, value judgments are like color judgments. If I judge that the wall is red correct, it is because the wall has a certain property of being red (Hurka, 2003: 614-615).
(b) The second is simplicity and non-naturalistic view. If moral properties can be defined in terms of natural properties, then moral issues will be judged by empirical observations. Also, they held that rightness and goodness are not combinations of two or more properties or relations. As a result, the simplicity of rightness and goodness implies that these properties are indefinable (Moore, 1922:271-274).
(c) Moore explained two methods to prove his notion of intrinsic good. One is called the method of isolation. In this case, Moore held that value judgments are not influenced by relations or people’s attitude towards them. Therefore, Ross though goodness is a form of consciousness and moral judgments like other objective propositions can be true or false. Another method which Ross accepted is the principle of organic unities. In other words, the value of a whole is not equal to the value of its parts, and the parts do not contribute to the value of the whole. He thought at least one case illustrates the doctrine. Few people would hesitate to say that a state of affairs in which A is good and happy and B bad and unhappy is better than one in which A is good and unhappy and B bad and happy. The surplus value of the first whole arises not from the value of its elements but from the co-presence of goodness and happiness in one single person, and badness and unhappiness in another (Hurka, 2014: 232-23).
(d) Moore’s ideal utilitarianism shows pluralism. Discussion of Ross’s pluralism tends to focus on his doctrine of prima facie duties. More than two- thirds of The Right and the Good discusses this subject. Much of this is negative and attacks those who deny that goodness is a simple, non-natural property. Following Moore, Ross divides such goods into those that have some parts that have no value, and those that have either simple intrinsic goods or complex wholes all the parts are intrinsically good (ultimate goods) (Stratton-Lake, 2007: xi, xii).
3- Different kinds of good
Ross argues that there are three simple ultimate goods, and one complex (which cannot be reduced to the value of its elements). Simple goods are virtue, pleasure, and knowledge. The complex good is the distribution of happiness in proportion to virtue which he calls justice.
The first thing which he claims to be good is virtuous disposition or action which are done from any one of certain motives. Ross was the first who could distinguish three forms of virtue: the desire to do one’s duty, the desire to bring into something good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain to others (Ross, 2007: 134-137). In contrast, Kant believed that the only morally good action is done from the sense of duty which is related to the nominal part of human being, while other desires are related to the phenomenal part of the human (Kant, 1990: 24-28).
The second intrinsic good is pleasure. If we imagine two worlds equal in virtue, though in the first there is a widespread and intense pleasure, while in the second there is widespread and intense pain, we would have no doubt that the first is better. This shows that virtue is not the only thing that is good on its own.
The third intrinsic (ultimate) good is justice. By justice, Ross means the proportion of happiness to virtue and misery to vicious. Finally, he believes that knowledge and true belief are intrinsically good (Ross, 1959: 270).
4- Morally good action
Now Ross asks what the criterion of an amorally good action is. Can we call an action good by looking at its consequences or is it related to another aspect? Ross argues that goodness is a consequential attribute, that which is good by virtue of something else in its nature, i.e. by saying that it is a certain sort of character. Therefore, he held that virtue and moral goodness are the same, because he thought virtue has three forms, and all these together make a morally good character (Ross, 2007: 169).
Conclusion
The concept of good is so important in ethics that almost all moral philosophers tried to explain it. Ross also had a new and different analysis of this concept. He, unlike Moore, thought that good is not reduced to the normative concept and each is different. He also unlike Kant held that a moral action is one that is done not only by one motive which sense of duty but from other kinds of motives which make a morally good character.
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