Journal of Philosophical Investigations

Document Type : Research Paper


Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University (IKIU), Qazvin, Iran


 In each one of the well-known Abrahamic religions, notably Islam, Christianity and Judaism, there are two important doctrines which seem to be inconsistent, but nonetheless some religious philosophers like Plantinga try to show that there is no conflict between them. The first doctrine is that God is Omniscient and He has foreknowledge of all that will happen in the future and thus all human actions are determined in His knowledge. The second doctrine is that human beings have free will and they are responsible for all of their voluntary actions. The problem is that if all future actions of a person are determined in divine knowledge, it is impossible for him to change his future and so he is not free.  This article will assess some of the solutions given to the problem and it will focus on Plantinga's solution to the problem and then it will unravel some defects of his solution. At the end of this article, a new solution to the problem will be given, in which the free will of human being is confirmed while the nature of divine knowledge is regarded ambiguous to the extent that its changeability or unchangeability is left unknown.


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