Faranak Bahmani; Ali Hosseini
Abstract
Explaining the extent of human influence on existence and his role in determining and changing his destiny is one of the most important theological topics that has always been the focus ...
Read More
Explaining the extent of human influence on existence and his role in determining and changing his destiny is one of the most important theological topics that has always been the focus of thinkers and scholars of various schools of Islamic philosophy and theology. In order to explain this problem in terms of proof, three general views of determinism, delegation, and inter-commands have been formed. Mu'tazili and Imamiyya theologians, due to the defense of man's responsibility against the actions issued by him and the meaning of punishment and reward, have accepted the relative independence of man in determining his destiny in the sense of having free will. Ghazali's view that accepting free will for humans violates the Unity of Actions and, by implying commitment, limits the power and will of God Almighty, believes in predestination and acquisition. After explaining the concept of free will and human predestination, the present essay examines the validity of this claim by referring to Ghazali's works through the descriptive-analytical method. Findings: Ghazali does not believe in the system of causality between the phenomena of existence, and considers the repetition of existing relationships and order to be caused by God's custom. Fate and Fortuity determine all the events and phenomena of the world, and all the actions of existence are God's voluntary and optional actions. Results: Ghazali does not assign a role to man in determining his destiny, with the exclusiveness of will and authority to the Almighty God and the prior determination of events in Fate and fortune. His appeal to the idea of "business" in line with the responsibility of man for his actions has not been able to solve the paradox of determinism and punishment and reduce the intellectual problems of determinism.
