Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Assistant Professor of Islamic Philosophy Department, Azarbaijan Shahid Madani University, Tabriz, Iran
Abstract
The main question of this article is that what are the important differences or similarities between Aristotle's and Frege's analysis of the categorical proposition? Based on the famous view, Aristotle analyzes the categorical proposition into three components: Subject, Predicate and Relation; while Frege analyzes the categorical proposition into two components of Variable and Function, and therefore; these two analyses are completely different and there is no similarity between them. In the other article, I have argued that in the Aristotle's viewpoint, in the logical analysis of the categorical proposition, against its linguistic analysis, it is divided into two main components of subject and predicate. At this article, I have shown that by accepting of this analysis and based on it, it becomes clear that: firstly, there are important similarities between these two analyses: 1) both are two-part analyses 2) Aristotle, like Frege, considers «to be attributed to something else» to be the essential feature of the predicate part; Secondly, there are important differences between them: 1) Aristotle considers «to be attributed to something else» to be merely the essential property of the Role of Predicate, but Frege considers it to be also the essential property of general concepts that replaces in this role, and therefore 2) Frege, against Aristotle, maintains that general concepts cannot be the subject of propositions. This viewpoint of Frege is based on the «Fundamental distinction between Object and Concept». Therefore the root of the differences between the two analyses should be sought in this assertion..
Keywords
- Aristotle (1995) The Complete Works, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 5th Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ackrill, J. L. (2002) Aristotle Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ammonius (2014) Ammonius: on Aristotle “on Interpretation 1-8.”, Tr. David Blank, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Frege, G. (1980) "Function and Concept", in Translations from The Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, pp. 21-41, ed. Peter geach & Max black, tr. P. geach, 3rd Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Frege, G. (1997) "Comments on Sinn and Bedeutung", in The Frege Reader, pp. 172-80, ed. Michael Beany, tr. Peter Long and Roger White, 1st Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Frege, G. (1997) "Logic", in The Frege Reader, pp. 227-50, ed. Michael Beany, tr. Peter Long and Roger White, 1st Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Peter Geach (1972) Logic Matters, 1st Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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