Document Type : Research Paper
Author
PhD Candidate in Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
Abstract
U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship will be disappeared or settled in favor of materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At the first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to subject in hand; although the rest of paper will be also contained more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to take type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
Keywords
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