Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Isfahan
2 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Isfahan
Abstract
When an agent acts contrary to his, all-things-considered, best judgment while he is able to do the best he acts akratically. Socrates for the first time posed the problem. He believed that akrasia is impossible since nobody can act wrong intentionally or waiver the best. But it sometimes seems that people commit evil intentionally; the reason, according to Socrates, is that they count the action in question as good due to their ignorance. Equating the good and pleasant, Socrates declares that the claim that "reason is sometimes overcame by passion" is baseless. Socrates knows nothing more powerful than knowledge. But Aristotle is known to be a defender of possibility of akrasia. He distinguishes between actualized and suspended knowledge. Agent with suspended knowledge may know related universals but particulars, or he may know both, but his knowledge is superficial like an asleep, insane or a drunken man. It is only the suspended knowledge that might be acted contrary to. It is not comprehensible that an agent equipped with actualized knowledge slips. This paper tries to show that, despite the opinion of some scholars, Aristotle's standpoint is very close to that of Socrates.
Keywords
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