Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Mohamad Hossein Mohamad Ali Khalaj ¹
• Ata Heshmati ²

¹ PhD Candidate of Philosophy,, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

² MA. in Philosophy of Science , Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Dialogue between Dreyfus, as the biggest American commenter of Heidegger and Merleau-ponty, and Searle, as one of the biggest analytic philosophers, started at the seventies. According to Searle, phenomenology is superficially and blind and has systematic errors. Additionally, in his view the concept of non-representational intention as center of Dreyfus’s phenomenology is inconsistent. But, in our opinion, Dreyfus introduces a consistent concept of non-representational intention, and proposes that Searle does not have a correct understanding of phenomenology. Dreyfus differentiates (draws distinction) between two interpretations of Searle: Searle as phenomenologist and Searle as analytic (analytical) philosopher. Dreyfus believes Searle’s approach as a phenomenologist is wrong because ignores non-representational intention; He also critics/refuses Searle’s approach as analytic philosopher since this approach accepts a causality for an abstract structure. However, we believe Dreyfus (himself) fails to go beyond the subject-object dualism. Moreover, introducing non-representational intention is not enough for rejecting Descartes dualism.

Keywords

• intentionality
• representation
• phenomenology
• analytic philosophy
• dualism