Myth of the Nature of Reasoning

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tehran

Abstract

In this paper, I have tried to discuss the following questions:

Do reasons that have been/have not been put forward, all have a trans-historical and universal nature or essence? And has there been or will there be a unanimous consensus on that?
Why do so many reasons in the history of philosophy that seemed convincing at a time have lost their cogency?
When we say "I have become convinced by your reasons", do we mean that your reasons have characteristics that anyone in any historical era and with whatever cultural make-up who hears or reads it will become convinced?
Do we have to ask for the convincingness or persuasiveness of reasons and its measure?
Why is it that during the long history of argumentation, theorization, and taking of positions in philosophy, and during the not so long history of social sciences, there has not been a single position for which reasons have been advanced and those had convinced all those concerned?
Why is it that roughly for the number of philosophers who have reflected on the Idea of reasoning, there are different Ideas of reason.
Are reasons necessary for acquiring important and/or interesting knowledge?

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References

- Annas, J. (1986), "Plato, Republic V-VII", G. Vesey (ed.) Philosophers Ancient and Modern, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- DeRose, K. (2014), "Why Take a Stance on God?" in interview with Garry Gutting, The Stone, Sept. 18, 2014.
- Garber, D. (2014), "Can Wanting to Believe Make Us Believers?" in interview with Garry Gutting, The Stone, Oct. 5, 2014.
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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 10, Issue 19 - Serial Number 19
Articles
March 2016
Pages 163-172

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