Abdollahi, Mohammad Saeed; Javadi, Mohsen; Legenhausen, Muhammad

doi:10.22034/jpiut.2023.58699.3609

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

¹ Ph.D. Candidate of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Iran

² Professor, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Iran

³ Professor, Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2023.58699.3609

Abstract

One of the important ethical concepts that has occupied the minds of many philosophers in the past years is the concept of "moral certainty". This means whether there are moral propositions that are so certain that no doubt or argument or evidence can face them. According to some philosophers, for example, the statement "the wrongness of killing innocent people" brings us such moral certainty. Among the philosophers who have written in this field, two basic readings of Nigel Pleasants and Michael Kober can be mentioned. Pleasant considers moral certainty to be an absolute and natural concept that is the basis of our moral judgments, and on the other hand, Kober considers moral certainty to be a relative concept and believes that our certainties are rooted in linguistic society, culture and time. In this article, we try to address the different dimensions of the concept of "moral certainty" and the importance of its application in two different and important readings.

Keywords

Main Subjects

epistemology

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations

"Moral Certainty", One Concept, Several Perspectives; Evaluation of Two Relative and Absolute Approaches about "Moral Certainty" Based on Wittgenstein's On Certainty

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Volume 18, Issue 46 - Serial Number 46
articles
Vol. 18 , issue 46, Spring 2024
April 2024
Pages 13-29

"Moral Certainty", One Concept, Several Perspectives; Evaluation of Two Relative and Absolute Approaches about "Moral Certainty" Based on Wittgenstein's On Certainty

References

References

Send comment about this article

Volume 18, Issue 46 - Serial Number 46 articlesVol. 18 , issue 46, Spring 2024April 2024Pages 13-29

Volume 18, Issue 46 - Serial Number 46
articles
Vol. 18 , issue 46, Spring 2024
April 2024
Pages 13-29