Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• mahdi ahmadi ¹
• Yousef Nozohour ²

¹ Allameh tabatabei university

² Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Allameh Tabatabie University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

One cannot assess Kant’s critical project without the consideration of the Transcendental Idealism. This is due to the fact that it is the solution he finds for the perennial problem of metaphysics. Moreover, Kant thinks of transcendental idealism as an approach with which not only can metaphysics go through ‘the secure course of a science’ (Bxiv), but also ‘simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits’ (Bxxv) practical reason.

The most controversial aspect of his proposal is that he counts empirical objects as appearances rather than things in themselves. In other words, he simultaneously limits our knowledge to things as they appear and leaves things as they are in themselves outside our capacity for cognition.

In this article, I will consider Kant’s conception of the ‘thing in itself,’ and discuss whether Allison’s two-aspect reading can be a legitimate interpretation of Kant’s theory and whether it succeeds to unravel its problems. I will devote the first part of this article to Allison’s two-aspect reading of thing in itself and his solution to its paradoxes. In the second part, I will mention three objections raised by Guyer (as objections from the two-object point of view) against Allison’s reading and Kant’s main argument in Aesthetic. Finally, I will assess the internal cohesion of Allison’s interpretation and its compatibility with Kant’s texts. In conclusion, I will show that although (1) Allison can avert Guyer’s objections consistently and (2) his reading shows the overall intent of Kant’s project, (3) it is not completely compatible with Kant’s passages.

Keywords

• Kant
• thing in itself
• Henry Allison
• transcendental idealism
• refutation of idealism

Main Subjects

• epistemology