Partiality and Kantian Moral Theory

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

We have, among our moral concerns, both impartiality concerns and partiality concerns. Accordingly, any moral theory, including impartial theories, should somehow reconcile the two concerns. The basic question of this article is whether “valuing all persons equally” can be reconciled with “valuing partial motives and reasons and particular persons (deep partiality)”. This article aims to find, analyze, and explain an answer that the impartialist Kantian moral theory can provide to that question, as the theory faces important obstacles in reconciling impartiality and partiality. One obstacle is its emphasis on the “motive of duty,” which is in conflict with “partial motives”. The other is its emphasis on the value of humanity in persons, which appears to conflict with the value of particular persons, whereas in partiality we value particular persons, that is, for the sake of their individual features. In general, I have concluded that the defender of Kantian theory can explain the value of partial reasons or motives and the value of particular individuals in two steps. The first is that Kant believes that, in addition to the motive of duty, humans, based on their humanity and rational nature, have a special kind of value called “dignity”; therefore, we ought to revere humans. The second is to contemplate the “capacity to set ends,” an important feature of humanity and rational nature. Revering a person in situations where we have a personal relationship with someone requires our attention to the ends which we know he has, otherwise we have not revered his capacity to set his ends. The method has been to search, or rather to extract “implicit” ideas and concepts related to the issue of “partiality” from the Kantian moral theory. That is because “explicit” concerns of this theory –put forward during the modern era with its universalist viewpoint—were primarily “impartialist.”

Keywords

References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 19, Issue 52 - Serial Number 52
Articles
52 Autumn 2025
November 2025
Pages 385-404

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