The Distinction between a ‘Mental State’ and ‘Our Belief about It’ in the Thought of Armstrong and Shoemaker

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Candidate of Modern Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran

2 Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran

3 Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, , Tabriz, Iran

Abstract

Introspection is a method of accessing the contents of the mind. The nature of this access can be categorized into two main perspectives: the first group relates to explanations that consider introspection to be similar to perception, with the difference that the direction of the gaze is inward, not outward. For this reason, they are also known as “inner sense” explanations. The second group are explanations that consider introspection to be a kind of direct acquaintance and understanding of mental states. Believers in the second group, unlike the first group, rule out the possibility of error in introspection. David Armstrong belongs to the first group and Sidney Shoemaker to the second. Although Armstrong's claim is not without its flaws and sometimes even contradicts common intuition, it seems that the challenges facing Shoemaker are much deeper. The most important challenge for him is that his arguments - even assuming apparent clarity and solidity - are ultimately based on first-person testimony rather than objective facts, and therefore are much more difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Our goal in this article is to formulate the opposition between these two ideas in an analytical-critical manner and to criticize them as much as possible, and to show that the problem of introspection cannot be solved in the realm of the mind.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 19, Issue 52 - Serial Number 52
Articles
52 Autumn 2025
November 2025
Pages 161-178

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