A Critique of Applying Wittgenstein's Epistemic Insights to Ethics

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Although Wittgenstein, especially in his later philosophy, did not explicitly discuss ethics, his method of philosophizing holds particular significance and gives hope that some of his insights may be applied in that domain as well. Some philosophers, referring to On Certainty, have argued that there are moral certainties that function analogously to the epistemic certainties Wittgenstein discusses. I aim to show that, although moral propositions may serve a similar structural role, they differ in several crucial respects from the certainties Wittgenstein examined: There are multiple moral language-games, each grounded in different certainties; these certainties themselves rest upon epistemic ones; yet, unlike epistemic certainties, the basic certainties of moral language-games are not embedded in our instinctive actions. Moreover, the propositions expressing them are typically general statements- often ambiguous or allowing exceptions. Clarifying their meaning or specifying the conditions of exception opens the door to divergent interpretations and ensuing disagreements. Finally, unlike epistemic certainties, there are alternatives to acting in accordance with moral certainties. All these considerations point to a significant difference between moral certainties and the kind of certainty Wittgenstein discusses.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 19, Issue 52 - Serial Number 52
Articles
52 Autumn 2025
November 2025
Pages 141-160

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