Grammar and Rules: Chomsky and Wittgenstein in Contrast

Document Type : Research Paper

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Assistant Professor, Faculty of Contemporary Intercultural Studies, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran. Iran

Abstract

Noam Chomsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein represent two major and fundamentally different approaches to the relationship between language and thought. Both are widely regarded as seminal figures whose reflections on language have been transformative within their respective fields. Yet in what crucial respects do their views on language diverge, and why is a comparison between them philosophically significant? A comparative examination of their thought, independent of any prior commitment to either position, is valuable in its own right, since attention to the extent and depth of the divergence between these two lines of thought provides important insight into major currents in contemporary philosophy and linguistics. Chomsky’s mentalistic approach to linguistic rules brought about a revolutionary shift in linguistic studies, whereas, slightly earlier, the later Wittgenstein’s views provoked serious debates among his philosophical contemporaries and gave rise to a novel direction in the philosophy of language. Wittgenstein’s innovative approach to language developed along a path fundamentally opposed to Chomsky’s revolutionary program in linguistics, insofar as Wittgenstein redirected philosophical attention away from the inner domain of the mind toward outward behavior, social practices, and forms of life. Employing an analytic method and drawing primarily on the works of these two thinkers, this article focuses in particular on their respective conceptions of grammar and linguistic rules and examines some of their central arguments. The analysis shows that essentialism in Chomsky’s thought, and its rejection in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, constitutes a fundamental difference in their approaches to language. This fundamental divergence, in turn, carries significant implications for social issues, including the nature and possibility of dialogue.

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Grammar and Rules: Chomsky and Wittgenstein in Contrast

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 55 - Serial Number 55
Articles
Issue 55, Summer 2026
July 2026
Pages 597-616

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