The Possibility of Moral Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence: a philosophical explanation of the responsibility gap

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD in Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran

2 Professor of Western Philosophy Department, Research Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In recent years, the emergence and rapid use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have posed a fundamental question for moral philosophy and the technology: how can moral responsibility be meaningfully articulated in a context where decision-making and action are carried out by non-human entities? In the classical philosophical tradition, moral responsibility has been intrinsically linked to human agency, intention, consciousness, and free will; however, the advent of intelligent technologies has profoundly challenged this traditional linkage. Aiming to re-conceptualize moral responsibility in relation to artificial intelligence, this article seeks to advance a philosophical account of the challenges surrounding it—commonly referred to as the “responsibility gap”.‌ The research methodology adopted in this article is analytical–interpretive and grounded in the philosophy of technology and AI ethics. The findings indicate that within human–machine interactive networks, classical models of responsibility are no longer sufficient. Instead, responsibility must be understood within a relational, intersubjective, and distributed framework encompassing both human and non-human agents. In the subsequent stage, through the analysis of two applied case studies, concrete instances of the responsibility gap are examined. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a three-level model of moral responsibility—design-level, organizational-level, and institutional-level responsibility. The study aims to demonstrate that, in the face of emerging technologies, the question of a single moral agent gives way to an inquiry into a network of relations, influences, and reciprocal forms of accountability.‌ In conclusion, the article argues that the possibility of moral responsibility in artificial intelligence can only be defended if one moves beyond the classical individual-centered approach and reconceptualizes responsibility as an institutional and participatory mechanism embedded within the full constellation of human and non-human factors.

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The Possibility of Moral Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence: a philosophical explanation of the responsibility gap

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Investigations
Volume 20, Issue 55 - Serial Number 55
Articles
Issue 55, Summer 2026
July 2026
Pages 243-266

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